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We want to pose some questions about the relationship 
between social movements and 'social movement theories'. 
The questions reflect the sense of unease experienced by 
some 'academic intellectuals' who are also activists in 
movements, and the scepticism sometimes expressed by 
activists about the value of 'social movement theory.'  
Both of us having a foot in each camp, we share the 
unease. 
 
1. ACADEMIC & MOVEMENT INTELLECTUALS 
 
Academics and Movements 
 
No one could sensibly argue that academic work - and 
journalism - is of no use to movements. When studies of 
the inequality of income and wealth distribution appear, 
for example, we often use them to strengthen our case. We 
gain usable technical knowledge from ecologists about the 
workings of pollution, and from geneticists about the 
dangers of GM foods. The knowledge we have of 
movements in the past - with which we sometimes 
identity, and from which we sometimes draw practical 
'lessons' - is mostly derived from the work of academic 
historians. Journalists and academics provide vital 
information about movements in other countries. 
Anthropologists - and SF writers! - help us build vision of 
different ways our species has lived, might live. 
However, more problematic questions arise in relation 
to a specific area of academic study, signaled by the title 
of the new journal: Social Movement Studies. Over the last 
few decades, a whole institutional academic apparatus - 
even including this conference! - has arisen, whose central 
focus is the theorization of movements and popular 
struggles. In North America, the Collective Behavior and 
Social Movements Section of the ASA has, reportedly, 
some 500 paid-up members. There are several journals 
devoted to this kind of work, and many other professional 
sociology and political science journals regularly carry 
articles in the field. Here there occur ongoing debates 
about how to theorize the (possibly changing) experience 
of movements, their ideas, their activities, their forms of 
                                                          
1 This paper has its origins in conversations over several 
years between the authors. Colin Barker gave a presentation 
under the title '"Let me through, I'm a social theorist!" - some 
sceptical notes on social movements and academe' at the 
ORGANIZE! conference at Columbia University, April 2000. 
Laurence Cox wrote ‘Outside the whale: (re)thinking social 
movements and the voluntary sector’ with Martin Geoghegan for 
the 7th Alternative Futures and Popular Protest conference in 
April 2001. 
organization, and their contests with the powerful. This is 
the area we want to ask questions about. 
What should we say about this kind of work? 
Let's begin with the slightly uncomfortable observation 
that academic work is in a sense parasitic on facts mostly 
produced by movements (and their opponents and allies). 
Social movement theory is not peculiar, of course, in this 
parasitism: the whole of the philosophy of science, for 
example, is parasitic in the same sense on the work of 
scientists. 
It is sometimes suggested that the relationship between 
academics and movements is simple: academics provide 
'knowledge' and movements produce 'access'. That this 
won't do is obvious: for movements and their activists also 
produce 'knowledge'. So, what perhaps needs more 
exploration is the nature of and the relationship between 
the two kinds of knowledge and between their two kinds 
of producers. 
 
Two types of intellectuals 
 
We owe to Gramsci (1999a: 134ff) a distinction between 
'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals. The former term 
refers to those who played an 'intellectual function', 
essentially as part of the status quo in early 20th century 
Italy, and the latter to those who played a similar function 
in popular movements and parties. By the first term, 
Gramsci denoted such people as university professors, 
lawyers, priests, and others; by the second, above all, 
activists of the Communist and other workers' parties. 
Gramsci emphasizes the 'directive' activity of intellectuals 
of both types - as e.g. engineers and small-town doctors 
but also as organizers. Eyerman and Jamison (1991) make 
a similar distinction between 'established' and 'movement' 
intellectuals. These distinctions seem quite useful. Here 
we will distinguish between 'academic' and 'movement' 
intellectuals, suggesting an initial polarity between them, 
in terms of the tasks they undertake and the goals they 
pursue, their audiences and their relationships with them, 
their accreditation, and - perhaps most important - the 
forms of knowledge they produce. And we can notice one 
immediate difference. To be an academic intellectual is, in 
a sense, always to be a member of the 'intelligentsia'; but a 
worker or a peasant can be a 'movement intellectual.' 
In the real world, of course, the types are sometimes 
combined together in individuals and groups. Many of 
those who are drawn to this field of academic study are 
themselves former or continuing activists and participants 
in actual movements and movement organizations. It's 
been suggested (e.g. Morris and Herring 1987; Mayer in 
Lyman 1995) that part of the impulse to the American 
shift away from 'collective behaviour' to 'resource 
mobilization' and 'political process' theories was a 
response to the movements of the 1960s.2 Those with feet 
in both camps are often aware of contradictions and 
tensions in their different roles. Thus Nancy Naples notes 
a demand placed on the authors in her collection on 
Community Activism and Feminist Politics, to 'find a 
balance between the passion they felt for the community 
action or activists they were working with and the 
detachment needed to present their analyses'  (1998b: 7).  
Nick Crossley (1999) suggests that sometimes 
academicism can cause problems in movements. 
Academics involved in movements, he notes, have their 
own style or hexis which is tacitly recognized by those 
who share it, and who are drawn towards each other.  
More to the point, that hexis is explicitly recognized by 
others who don't share it, and who find it strange and 
alienating.  These may fear that the 'intellectuals' will turn 
the movement into a 'talking shop' (where they will be 
skilled and comfortable) rather than a place where things 
get done.  
A more extreme but by no means unknown example 
occurs where academics’ interest in movements is 
motivated primarily by an association with the forces of 
state repression. 19th century cases include individuals 
such as the Prussian theorist of police Lorenz von Stein 
(usually credited with coining the expression 'social 
movement') and the French police informer Gustav Le 
Bon (noted for his theories of 'the crowd'). More recently, 
Oskarsson and Peterson (2001) - in the wake of the 
shooting of three activists (one of whom was critically 
wounded) at Göteborg – came to the following practical 
conclusions: 
* As far as possible police should avoid direct 
confrontations with activists because of the risk of loss 
of control; 
* However, for dealing with 'packs' of activists, police 
should 'delegate considerable action authority to police 
officers in the field'; 
* negotiations with activists should be used as a 
'preventive strategy'; 
* 'increased police training is required in order to 
better identify potential militant activists'; 
* 'police intelligence gathering and surveillance will 
continue to be vital'. 
These conclusions suggest one extreme opposition 
between academic intellectuals and movement 
intellectuals, which can perhaps best be summed up in the 
theoretical question 'which side are you on?'  
Provisionally, we can distinguish several dimensions 
of distinction between academic intellectuals and 
movement intellectuals: first, what kind of knowledge do 
they produce? second, what's their 'relevant community'? 
and, third, who plays the part? 
 
Forms of Knowledge 
Academic and movement intellectual work tend to 
demand rather different kinds of intellectual output.  
So far as academic work is concerned, consider a 
couple of examples from leading social movement 
theorists. Lofland (1996:66-9) holds up as a goal ('the 
                                                          
2 Rule (1989: 145) declares the shift 'something as close as 
social science is apt to come to an authentic theoretical 
revolution.' 
higher quest' to which the academic researcher should 
aspire) the formation of generic propositions - that is, 
propositions fitting several cases of social movement 
organizations, as distinct from mere case propositions 
which apply only to the case at hand. The search for 
generic propositions is also signaled by McAdam, Tarrow 
and Tilly, who seek forms of explanation involving 'the 
identification of causal chains consisting of mechanisms 
that reappear in a wide variety of settings but in different 
sequences and combinations, hence with different 
collective outcomes' (2001: 23). In both examples, the 
focus is on explanation of a normal 'scientific' type. 
Argument among social movement scholars, as in other 
areas of the social sciences, tends to focus on the nature of 
the explanations required. 
As Geoghegan and Cox (2001) put it, academic 
theorizing is embedded in specific institutional 
relationships. It attempts to explain both individual facets 
of movement activity and to create or add to a ‘field of 
knowledge’ (such as ‘social movement studies’). 
Therefore, it produces certain types of theorizing, whose 
strengths (at their best) include a broad conceptual 
armoury but whose weaknesses (from an activist point of 
view) lie in the tendency to treat what are, precisely, 
movements as static ‘fields’, to embed their understanding 
in an uncritical acceptance of the givenness of those 
institutions which movements often set themselves 
against, and to marginalize the position of the actor.  
If the academic quest is for the well-formed generic 
proposition or the superior explanation, that is, for the 
theoretical concept or generalization which covers a set of 
seemingly dissimilar cases or processes, it is not the case 
that movement intellectuals have no interest in these.  
However, their primary interests do not lie here. Rather, 
generic propositions perform a subordinate function in 
their reasoning, not as goals in themselves but rather as 
merely parts of an apparatus of activist argument whose 
central concern lies elsewhere - in formulating 'case 
propositions' of a very definite and practical nature.  These 
take the form, in essence, of practical proposals, i.e. 
propositions that 'This is what we should do.' 
Consider a couple of examples. The first concerns two 
treatments of the question of 'revolutionary situation' - in 
Lenin and in Tilly. Lenin (1966) argues that it is vitally 
necessary to recognize what is and what is not a 
revolutionary situation.  And he offers a famous generic 
proposition: revolutionary situations involve the 
simultaneous presence of two crucial elements, the ruling 
class's inability to rule in the old way and the people's 
refusal to be ruled in the old way.  If either of these is 
absent, says Lenin, there isn't a revolutionary situation.  
Lenin's definition, suitably adapted and developed, can be 
taken as the basis for an academic disquisition on 
revolutionary situations (witness Tilly 1978, 1993).   
However, the purpose and the meaning of Lenin's 
definition cannot be separated from its context. It occurs 
in a pamphlet with the decidedly non-academic title, Left-
Wing Communism : An Infantile Disorder. Lenin's is 
intervening in a practical argument within the newly 
formed Communist International, to argue that [a] the 
situation in 1920 is no longer as immediately 
revolutionary as it had been in 1919, [b] communists must 
know the difference between revolutionary and non-
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revolutionary situations, since each requires different 
kinds of organization and activity and [c] communists in 
the new situation need to learn how to form united fronts 
with reformists. The generic proposition is subordinate to 
the practical case proposition, which is concerned with 
'what is to be done,' in this concrete circumstance.3
The second example also involves the relation of 
theory and practice. Discussing 'mechanisms and 
processes', McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) propose 
that mechanisms 'concatenate into processes', which 
represent larger-scale objects for theoretical comparison. 
As it happens, Lukacs (2000), in his last 'Leninist' text), 
addresses related issues about theorization of processes. 
Only his case is, essentially, that processes 'concatenate' 
into what he terms 'moments of decision.' Lukacs's 
argument is not, of course, with contemporary American 
academic theorists, but with two representatives of what 
might be termed 'Second International Marxism', whose 
view of the historical process is rather inevitabilistic and 
'processual'. The issue between them is how to explain the 
failure of the 1919 Hungarian revolution, in which the 
young Lukacs had been a committed participant. His 
opponents account for the defeat in terms of a set of 
'processes' which were somehow beyond human 
intervention. For Lukacs, however, such general processes 
do no more than set the parameters, as it were, within 
which Hungarian communists could and had to work; 
indeed, these generated a variety of immediate 'moments 
of decision' when the actions of the Hungarian Communist 
Party leadership proved decisive.   
In essence, Lukacs's opponents argued that the 
Hungarian Revolution was lost due to factors beyond 
human control; Lukacs's riposte is, 'No, comrades, we 
blew it!'  Had the Hungarian CP leadership been better 
equipped theoretically, they would not have made the 
mistakes they did, and the outcome would have been - for 
good or ill - different4.  Now, to return to McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly, they never seem to provide a basis for 
saying, 'They blew it....' (or, of course, 'They got it right, 
for the following reasons').  They do get close, sometimes, 
but seem to stop inquiring just as the issue comes near to a 
head.  They note, for example, following McAdam (1999), 
that the Civil Rights Movement 'socially appropriated' the 
Black church network, but talk about social appropriation 
as a 'mechanism' rather than a more or less deliberate 
activity.  They record that the Communist Party in the 
Philippines effectively abstained from taking any active 
position during the 1980s revolution against Marcos, and 
even note that the Party had the capacity, had it 
intervened, to make a decided difference to what 
happened, but they do not further explore this interesting 
                                                          
                                                          
3  Indeed, Lenin is sometimes rather careless in his offering 
of generic propositions, for they are not the centre of his 
attention.  Rather, they serve only as part of his always practical 
argument for adopting a specific strategic position. 
4 For a more recent example of this approach, see Eamonn 
McCann’s War and an Irish town (1974, 1993). The first edition 
chronicles the process whereby activists in and around the Civil 
Rights movement ‘blew it’, or more exactly were rolled over by 
the twin forces of the British state and the Provisionals. The 
foreword to the second edition offers a response in terms of what 
might have worked at the time. 
abstention.5 In short, they largely avoid concrete political 
judgment.  They do not offer grounds for saying, 'That 
was a practical mistake,' or '(Ideally), had we been there, 
we would have spoken or acted thus....' 
 
Contemplative and activist theorizing 
All of this betokens a certain 'distance' between much 
social movement theory and actual social movement 
practice.  To rephrase Marx’s comments in the Theses on 
Feuerbach (1845), social movement theory is essentially 
contemplative in nature, at least with respect to its 
subject.6 Social movements, that is, are engaged with as 
objects of study to be observed, described and explained; 
not as active processes that people engage with, 
experience and transform.  
The results of this are also recorded by McAdam: 
Reflecting the influence of ... broad structural theories, 
most recent empirical work has tended to focus on the 
role of system-level factors in either facilitating or 
constraining movement activity.  Consequently, we 
know comparatively little about the lived experience of 
activism and the everyday strategic concerns of 
movement groups. (1996: 339) 
It's not at all clear that the 'new structuralism' proposed 
by McAdam and his colleagues, any more than the 'old', 
can overcome this limitation on its own knowledge.  What 
we are arguing is that, at some point in its theoretical 
development, academic social movement theory must hit 
up against some such limit to its understanding of its 
object, because - perhaps because of its 'extra-knowledge' 
concerns and commitments - it denies itself the role of 
'active subject'.7
5 Similarly, while academic discussions of the Communist 
Parties in Italy and France tends to register how they did their 
best to bring matters under control, activist commentary tends to 
suggest that because the parties had turned out to be counter-
revolutionary it was important, either to build a different kind of 
party, or to focus on non-party forms of struggle. 
6 Its authors do of course actively pursue a range of 
eminently practical objectives via the production of social 
movement theory: they seek appointments and promotions, 
achieve publication and funding, gain academic and (sometimes) 
public status and recognition, and no doubt succeed in meeting a 
wide variety of essentially private needs in the process. But their 
orientation to their subject is not that of practitioners – and this is 
marked even by comparison with e.g. other political scientists 
and social policy specialists, who take up the role of advisor (to 
states, but occasionally to movements) with a far greater 
frequency. 
7  Some (European) sociologists claim that their research 
methodologies get them beyond the position of the academically 
structured well-formed proposition, in that they explore 
movements' own self-understandings with movement members. 
See for example the work of Touraine and Melucci.  However, 
these authors’ work is marked, still, by a disjuncture between the 
forms of knowledge they produce and those produced by 
movement intellectuals. For at a certain point in their 
development, they cease to be 'critical'. They refuse, beyond a 
given limit, to make an intervention in the movement of a 
practical kind: to answer such questions as 'what should we do?'  
They can produce a sense of some contradictions and tensions 
within a movement's own current thought and practice, but not 
the means to resolve these.  This research is thus marked by a 
kind of political abstentionism, which is very marked in the case 
of Touraine and his colleagues in Poland (Touraine 1983).  
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By comparison, the kind of knowledge produced by 
movement intellectuals tends to address different kinds of 
questions. In the terms of the Theses on Feuerbach, these 
questions are guided by their active engagement – not 
only with relation to movements, but also with relation to 
the social world within which those movements move, and 
which they seek to transform. 
Thus, activists' theorizing is not necessarily dominated 
by the theorization of activism, and is not restricted to an 
alternative 'social movements theory'. Rather, their 
specific theorizations of movements proceed from a 
broader theoretical context with relation to the social 
world as a whole, and changes in one understanding are 
usually reflected in changes in the other. Taking the 
example of Irish working-class community activism, 
Geoghegan and Cox (2001) note that activist theorizing 
starts from specific structural relationships – of class and 
poverty, gender and violence, ethnicity and exclusion – 
and attempts to change these relationships through agency 
(which necessarily involves an implicit or explicit 
theorizing element). This theorizing attempts to explain 
both how the structures that activists grapple with work 
and how 'best practice' activism can change it. The famous 
'structure / agency' problematic of sociology does not 
operate in the same way for agents who are challenging 
structures. 
Activist thinking produces a particular kind of 
theorization of movements, which gives primacy to 
processes of self-understanding and attempts to start from 
the actor’s perspective, while logically stressing fluidity 
and process (since actors in movements seek above all to 
move, not to carry on playing the same parts for the rest of 
their lives!) Its potential weaknesses include a tendency to 
reproduce accepted wisdom, to be embedded in 
unreflected cultural constructs, and a limited conceptual 
armoury – but one which is perhaps used more fluently 
and flexibly than the 'elaborated code' of academia. 
Two kinds of argument are looked for in the 
theoretical contributions of movement intellectuals. The 
first is the ideological and moral justification of the 
movement, the promotion and elaboration of its ideas and 
their defence against attack.  Here it is not only the content 
of ideas, but also their rhetorical form which is significant, 
for much of the ideological work of movements consists 
of ripostes to critics and answers to the doubtful. Indeed, 
much of the actual development and clarification of 
movement ideologies often occurs in dialogical exchanges 
with opponents and potential allies (Steinberg 1999). The 
linguistic and literary forms - and the settings - in which 
movement ideas are expressed are much more varied than 
is the case with academic ideas. They range from books 
and pamphlets to newspapers, leaflets and posters, from 
sermons and speeches to slogans and songs on 
demonstrations, from formal orations to informal 
conversations, and so on. Appropriateness of form 
depends much more on the actual and varied speech 
                                                                                               
                                                          
One practical benchmark for the ultimately ‘academic’ or 
‘movement’ nature of research might be found in the social 
relations it is geared towards: peer reviewed papers, 
presentations at disciplinary conferences and the search for 
accreditation – or discussion papers, distribution at activist get-
togethers or within movement organizations and workshops in 
movement contexts. 
settings. The underlying purpose of ideological 
justification is practical: it is an inherent aspect of 
movement mobilization and organization. 
Second, movement intellectuals produce another kind 
of essentially practical idea: the strategic and tactical 
proposal. This is a complex proposition which links 
together a reading of the nature of the present situation 
(including its relevant history) with an action plan 
(including a risk-assessment etc) for the movement in the 
immediate future. It speaks to a 'we' with which the 
movement intellectual claims an immediate identification. 
That 'we' may be a formally defined 'movement' or 'party', 
or may be framed as 'ordinary people,' 'workers,' 'the 
Catholic community', 'Blacks', etc. Such propositions take 
a typical form: Given the overall situation, and our 
purposes and resources within it, this is how we should 
act.  The argumentation for such proposals may indeed 
include a whole raft of what Lofland terms 'generic 
propositions' of different kinds: lessons drawn from 
previous movement experiences as well as pieces of folk 
wisdom and moral homily (e.g., 'when the going gets 
tough only the tough keep going').  The strategic proposal 
seeks to grasp a sufficient account of the totality of a 
current situation, in order to guide action, rather than to 
capture a single aspect of the situation in a form where it 
can be compared with similar aspects in different 
situations.  Its persuasive force depends on its capacity to 
combine an explanatory account of the complexities and 
contradictions of the recent past and present with a 
proposal for active intervention in the immediate future. 
So generic propositions are useful, but only as more or 
less casual supports for practical arguments.8,9
To push the contrast between types of knowledge 
towards a limit, let us propose that social movement 
scholars produce knowledge about movements, but 
movement intellectuals produce knowledge for and within 
movements. And the practical aspect of movement 
intellectualism connects it much more obviously with the 
function of 'leadership.' 
This distinction is related to Gramsci’s distinction 
between traditional and organic intellectual activity. The 
scholar acts as a traditional intellectual, carrying out 
directive and theoretical activity on behalf of already-
existing, and already-powerful, social classes and groups. 
Their directive activity is entailed in the administration 
and development of an education system which is a central 
mechanism in reproducing class inequality and in 
legitimating the social order. The contemplative 
orientation of social movement scholars is thus that 
8  Sometimes the argumentation can involve quite long 
causal chains. Consider, say, Gramsci's discussion of the 
contradictory nature of everyday consciousness, a set of 
propositions which provide some of the architecture of his 
argument for a particular kind of communist party involved in a 
struggle for hegemony within wider movements.  But the basic 
principle still applies. 
9 We might distinguish between 'strategic' and 'tactical' 
proposals in terms of their temporal orientation. As an example 
of the 'strategic' type, consider Marx's argument, in the aftermath 
of the 1848 revolutions, that it may be ten or twenty years before 
European workers will have the capacity to move towards 
power. A 'tactical' proposal could be simply the utterance 
'Charge!' 
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entailed by routine teaching, routine marking, and routine 
research – one essentially similar whatever the content of 
their specialization. Since the primary purpose is to 
reinforce the given, modes of description and explanation 
are quite sufficient in practice. 
The activist, by contrast, qua organic intellectual,  
carries out directive and theoretical activity on behalf of 
subordinate classes and groups. These classes do not 
control institutions, resources and symbols in the same 
way as dominant groups. Though they are constantly 
creating such forms of self-expression and struggle, these 
forms are constantly being combated and colonized by the 
dominant. Organic intellectuals therefore find themselves 
constantly creating – not ex nihilo, but from social 
materials typically controlled or contested from above. 
Since the primary purpose is to create what is not yet in 
existence (hence, once again, movement), their modes of 
theorizing are those geared to engagement, conflict, and 
(importantly) discovery.  
 
What's the relevant community? 
For the academic intellectual, including the social 
movement scholar, the primary 'community' that validates 
her or his work qua academic is that composed of other 
academics, who form their own hierarchies of reward and 
respect, and their own criteria of success. Bluntly, getting 
past a PhD committee, an academic interview panel  or the 
editors of the American Sociological Review is a different 
enterprise from gaining the ear of a strike committee or a 
campaign to save ancient trees from logging. Indeed, the 
former involves a kind of sucking up which is largely 
missing in the latter. For, in return for suitable intellectual 
performance, the academic world dispenses something  
which is largely missing from the world of the movement 
intellectual: material advantage.  (The fact that the level of 
material advantage is on a different scale from that 
obtaining in, say, the world of finance or law does not 
make it unimportant; and it is of course attached to very 
significant symbolic advantages.) Criteria of academic 
success include such significant intangibles as 'citation' in 
other academics' work. Once achieved, status has a 
relatively high degree of permanence: PhDs and (the 
better) academic posts stick to the possessor for life; a 
successful book or article may still be cited thirty years 
later. 
Another way of putting this is to say that there are 
important pressures at work in academia which constrain 
intellectual independence: the need to achieve a permanent 
post or senior lectureship (and so impress superiors), the 
pressures of research assessment exercises and 
performance-related funding (which involve a number of 
forms of 'horizontal pressure'), the increasing 
proletarianization of academic work, and so on.  
The community that validates movement intellectuals 
is different: it is the movements themselves. To become in 
any meaningful sense a movement intellectual, one must 
be treated by significant others in the movement as 
playing that part, that is, as someone it's worth listening to, 
with whom it's worth conversing about the movement's 
past, present and future, its problems and tasks, its 
perspectives, its ideas and its practices.  The movement 
intellectual's audience - those who effectively credential 
an individual or group aspiring to this role - is the network 
of movement activists, and it is through their actual 
practice that the movement intellectual's ideas are, to the 
degree they are accepted, tested.  
The rewards for success are mostly intangible, though 
nonetheless valued: laughter, applause and the approval of 
fellow-activists are heady gifts. In a way that is far less 
true in academic life, some movement intellectuals may 
never achieve any kind of public prominence: it is not 
uncommon for individuals and groups to perform vital 
'backstage' intellectual work (as strategists and tacticians, 
as 'bridge leaders' and mobilizers, as the anonymous 
designers of posters and slogans, etc) without ever gaining 
any kind of personal recognition. Moreover, while there is 
an important sense in which movement intellectuals are 
'credentialed,' their credentials are awarded by the relevant 
movement, and in a manner which is in principle far less 
fixed and stable than is the case in academic life. The role 
of 'movement intellectual' has to be won and won again as 
a much more uncertain qualification. For the settings in 
which movements act and argue and the strategic and 
tactical problems movements they face, and in which 
movement intellectuals make their contributions, are such 
as to demand constant rethinking and innovation. 
 
Who plays the part? 
The making of an academic intellectual is a complex 
enterprise, involving the imbibing of formal education and 
a whole set of 'manners'. The academic must learn to write 
within a narrow range of literary styles, and to make 
plentiful reference to work by other academics (as well, in 
our field, as some reference to the work of movement 
actors). To become an academic is to adopt a middle-class 
professional hexis, a way of speaking, writing, a mode of 
dress etc., as well as a set of formal ideas. There is not 
much, in this respect, that differentiates 'social movement 
scholars' from academic intellectuals in other fields.10
Paths to becoming a movement intellectual are rather 
different. They vary according to the movement in 
question and the circumstances of its development. In the 
Civil Rights Movement in the US, for example, some of 
the most prominent 'public intellectuals' were church 
ministers (most famously Martin Luther King Jr.); the 
predominant sexism of the time excluded women from 
prominent public leadership roles, although (as Robnett 
1997 has documented) both Black and White women from 
varieties of backgrounds played critical intellectual roles 
(as 'bridge leaders') in the movement's development. King 
held a Harvard PhD in Divinity, but Fannie Lou Hamer 
came from a sharecropping background. In some 
circumstances, a lack of formal educational qualifications 
may be a positive advantage: Lech Walesa's idiosyncratic 
speaking style added to his popularity among Polish 
workers in 1980, for he 'sounded like one of us.'11
                                                          
10  We know of no systematic studies. It may be, on the one 
hand, that career paths in this field are a little more open to, say, 
women or members of ethnic minorities than in some older 
'disciplines'. On the other hand, social movements studies may be 
more white, masculine and middle-class than the rest of 
sociology, thanks to its overlap with the more conservative 
discipline of political science. 
11 At the same time, Walesa's own view of the academic 
intellectuals is open to question: his swift cooption of a visiting 
delegation from the Warsaw intelligentsia into the strike 
5 
As to how people become movement intellectuals, 
acquire the necessary skills and confidence, present 
themselves, and become accepted in the role, we can only 
offer some scattered suggestions. Gaining the 'right to 
speak' may derive from a claim to represent a specific 
'community' or organization, from demonstrated 
commitment to a cause, from being accredited by the 
media or from authorship of a well-known book, etc. 
Nancy Naples (1998a) discusses the mentoring of 
potential leaders, with 'old hands' proposing them as 
speakers, encouraging them to put themselves forward for 
particular positions, introducing them to informal 
networks of activists, apprenticing them, giving them 'the 
real story' behind given conflicts, interpreting statements 
for them and so forth. The birth of new movement 
organizations may provide opportunities for individuals 
who were excluded from leadership in older ones: Ella 
Baker played  foundational role in SNCC after battling 
against the practical sexism of the Baptist ministers who 
headed the SCLC; militant shop stewards may play 
powerful roles in 'unofficial' union movements in 
opposition to existing union bureaucracies.  
The range of skills required is varied, and they are 
commonly learned and exercised in varieties of social 
contexts: planning group actions; poster-making 
workshops, mass meetings, party newspapers, strikes, 
knocking on doors to canvas support. Movement 
intellectuals may have to prove their credentials by such 
activities as riding bicycles rather than driving cars, 
refusing to cross picket lines or to eat meat, being 
available for picketing and leafleting, being prominent in 
situations of confrontation, dressing in particular ways, 
making financial contributions, adopting definite speech 
styles, and so on. Family life and sexual practices can 
'decredential' would-be movement intellectuals. All these 
matters may be - more obviously than in academia - 
themselves regularly topics for debate within movements, 
often in connection with movement debates about 
structures and forms of 'good practice.' 
Although there is a sense in which we can see 
academic intellectuals forming 'schools of thought,' the 
chief focus falls on individuals and their career 
achievements. However, in movements, while the 
'intellectual function' (Gramsci) may be played by a 
notable individual, it is commonly played by an activist 
group, a 'cadre organization' (Piven and Cloward 1977).  
If we ask, who gets 'cited' as the source of a movement 
argument or idea, it is commonly not so much named 
persons like 'Dave Spart' or 'Moon Blossom' or 'Naomi 
Klein' as movement organizations like 'SNCC', 'Earth 
First!,' 'the SWP,' or movement media like Green 
Anarchist or 'the Manifesto group' or even 'the anti-
globalization movement' etc. Such groups possess and 
develop their own internal structures and divisions of 
labour, and their activist members regularly engage in 
ongoing discussions about the form and content of the 
ideas they should argue for within the wider movement, 
about the most effective means of their presentation (what 
Snow and Benford term 'framing'), and about appropriate 
                                                                                               
                                                          
leadership in Gdansk in August 1980 (Staniszkis 1981, Kowalik 
1983) betokened perhaps an overly deferential attitude to 
'intelligentsia experts'. 
forms of activity. Such groups typically engage in mutual 
monitoring of the movement's responses to itself as a 
means of checking its own performance. Movements in 
turn validate such groups' collective outputs of ideas and 
their shared practice, rather than simply their individual 
performances; at the same time, of course, the individual 
performances of group members reflect on the general 
credit of the group. 
Relating activist and academic theorizing 
 
The relationship between activist and academic theorizing 
is not simply that of a static contrast. As social processes, 
they are closely intertwined, in processes of colonization 
and resistance which operate in both directions. ‘Theory’, 
in the sense of the symbolic languages generated by these 
processes, is then affected in important ways both by the 
primary social locations of activist and academic 
theorizing and by the processes of (conflictual) dialogue 
which occur between them.  
 
Processes of colonization and resistance 
Marx’s observation that the means of intellectual 
production are normally in the hands of the ruling class 
has an important corollary: that social movements from 
below (as opposed to, say, 'class war from above') often 
need to conquer or produce their own means of 
intellectual production. Social movement actors, for their 
part, have to 'create a new language' (Marx 1852), another 
way of thinking which is more or less adequate to their 
new way of acting. Activist theorizing, then, is in 
important ways a process of cognitive liberation. 
The starting point is often the practical critique of 
'common sense'. All activists are familiar with the various 
ways everyday cultures and languages work to 
delegitimize their activity: comments parodied in the Irish 
activist joke, 'If youse were in Russia youse’d be fucked 
into the Liffey!' Their critiques of these are not simply 
external: activists, except where they grow up able to draw 
on oppositional cultures, also have to 'emancipate 
themselves from mental slavery', to quote Bob Marley.12  
For many activists, for example, it is a turning-point to 
be at the receiving end of police aggression and to 
discover that an institution they have been brought up to 
see as underwriting their safety and the moral order is in 
fact prone to violence against 'ordinary people' (as they 
may still see themselves), pursuing what they understand 
to be eminently moral (and often altruistic) pursuits. (This 
has been documented extensively in relation to riots 
(Drury 1996, Reicher 1996, Waddington 1996): police 
violence breaches the moral order not in relation to those 
who already oppose the police, but in relation to people 
who do not expect it.) 
Gramsci (1997; 1999b: 118–264) can be read as 
presenting us with a model of common sense which is 
essentially historical: an 'archaeology of knowledge' which 
mixes both 'the most archaic forms of superstition' with 
12 Obviously enough, even oppositional cultures have 
histories of their own, and are subject to processes of defeat and 
decay (for example, into particularism and traditionalism) as 
well as continuity and development. The process sketched here is 
thus important beyond the small numbers of individuals who 
may need to go through the entire process in the first person. 
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'the latest discoveries of scientific knowledge'. If so, then 
activism would simply be a case of the development of the 
individual – or the class – paralleling that of the species as 
a whole, and eventually winding up in possession of 
Marx’s ‘highpoint of philosophical development’.  
But of course the process of 'enlightenment' is not as 
linear as that – which is after all where Marx’s critique of 
Feuerbach starts. When budding activists start to think 
their way out of 'common sense', or to break what Blake 
described as 'mind-forg’d manacles', there is often an 
interest in forms of generalized understanding that might 
offer clarity, justification and a broader vision to underpin 
their activity.  
In these circumstances, Marxism may present itself as 
the summum of activist theory, a paramilitary organization 
may present itself as the peak of practical radicalism, or a 
new religious movement may present itself as the locus of 
all true knowledge. Along with these, university 
knowledge – perhaps particularly in peripheral societies – 
can also be of interest, not least because it can offer a 
practical and economic resolution to the problems people 
are struggling with, as well as an intellectual and 
emotional one. 
Activist theorizing can thus present itself as a process 
of throwing off the contemplative 'muck of ages' gathered 
by traditional intellectuals within universities, or perhaps 
more exactly its creative reworking, its cultivating for 
other purposes (as with Marx and Gramsci themselves).13
It can also, however, find itself subject to a 'brain 
drain', in which people associated with movements 
'migrate' to universities. This process is no doubt very 
different as between different movements and activists 
(class, for example, makes a major difference), and the 
nature of the migration varies: attempting to fit in to the 
new culture, making careers out of public critiques of ex-
comrades, turning activist knowledge to academic uses, or 
(more positively) finding a 'day job' that enables particular 
kinds of activism to continue, or becoming a 'sympathetic 
expert'. We could then turn our initial question around and 
ask, 'What have activists brought to academia?' 
 
What have we ever done for the Romans? 
Arguably activist theory has been a major creative forces 
within the academy. To take a series of well-known 
examples: cultural studies and social history, area studies 
of various kinds and environmental studies, and arguably 
sociology itself, all owe major debts to activist theorizing 
and activist theories. In some cases, such as cultural 
studies or environmental studies, it is not too much to say 
that they owe their existence to the adult education 
movement or the ecology movement respectively. (We 
will come to Marxism and feminism shortly).  
If our arguments  about to the essentially creative role 
of organic intellectuals are accepted, it is perhaps clear 
why activist theorizing should have played this kind of 
role. Taken out of its original pragmatic context and 
turned to contemplative uses, however, this theory is 
rapidly recolonized and becomes a source of new, 'sexy' 
                                                          
                                                          
13 Geoghegan and Cox (2001) describe this process from the 
viewpoint of activists looking for resources in academia, getting 
‘caught’ and looking for ways of breaking out. 
courses and research subjects whose purpose is to attract 
students, funding and status. 
 
Anti-capitalism between movement and reading list 
Three recent borderline cases can highlight something of 
the ambiguities involved in this process. Naomi Klein’s 
No Logo has become a major international bestseller, 
getting dedicated promotions in major chains of 
booksellers (an ironic fate for a book whose theme is the 
damage caused by transnational corporations). It is also 
increasingly used as an accessible introductory text in 
sociology courses.  
Klein is herself a syndicated journalist working for the 
largest Canadian newspaper and reporting on the anti-
corporate movement in the US. The core of the material, 
then, is generated by movement activism. The sections of 
her book dedicated to suggesting solutions, however, are 
by far the weakest – and stand out as particularly thin by 
comparison with the dramatic problems and movements 
she has documented.  
This makes sense given her location between 
movement and mainstream media – but also perhaps 
explains the book’s attractiveness to lecturers desperate to 
keep the attention of bored undergraduates. It is, one could 
say, sufficiently political in its subject matter to be 
interesting (to speak to students as active human beings), 
but not so political in its structure as to be unusable as a 
basis for examinations and essay-writing.14
A second example is Amory Starr’s Naming the 
Enemy, a much less mainstream text in that Starr is 
straddling the gap between movement and academia 
without passing the 'Go' of the media. Not only is the 
content much less readable, but the publishing house 
(Zed) is a smaller one dedicated to radical academic texts 
and theoretically-minded activists (an area important to 
our discussion).  
Arguably Starr pursues a double purpose in Naming 
the Enemy. On the one hand, she attempts to use her 
activist knowledge and background as a resource to 
achieve recognition within academia – and the fact that 
her book is the first work by a sociologist on the 'anti-
globalization movement' is likely to stand her in good 
stead in this process. On the other hand, and more 
interestingly, she also uses the apparatus of academic 
research to argue for particular positions within the 
movement and against others.15 However, we have yet to 
see any evidence of success in this. (Perhaps the book's 
strong defence of fundamentalist responses to 
globalization may explain something of the silence that 
has settled over it since September 11th.) Nevertheless, it 
is worth signaling both that some academics do try to 
break out of the 'contemplative' mode and that they are not 
necessarily very successful in doing so. 
14 Klein herself, to give her her due, has been willing to 
speak at events such as the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, 
and arguably brings a certain degree of publicity to the 
movement in doing so, in that she is now herself a celebrity 
thanks to her reporting on it. Whether these relationships are 
entirely healthy is another question; see Gitlin (1980) for an 
analysis of how movement celebrity can go badly wrong. 
15 Joachim Raschke (1990) attempted a similar intervention 
within the factional conflicts of die Grünen. 
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Finally, Michael Hardt and Toni Negri’s Empire marks 
a particularly complex practical relationship. Negri is 
orignally a left-wing academic who fell foul of the post-
1968 witchhunts of 'terrorist sympathizers' carried out by 
the Italian state, a process which led hundreds if not 
thousands of Italians to seek exile abroad (Ruggiero 
1999). Negri continued academic work in Paris, but 
returned to Italy – and jail - a few years ago to highlight 
the plight of less well-known exiles.  
Coming as it did after the protests in Seattle, the book 
has attracted widespread attention (much of it critical) in 
academia and the media, but also among activists. Its 
curiosity from an activist point of view, however, is the 
explicitly 'hands-off' role it assigns to activists: 'the 
multitude', according to Hardt and Negri, will take care of 
matters, despite their purported inability to communicate 
with one another or build solidarity (see Cox 2001 for a 
more detailed critique). In other words, the analysis of 
structure is in some ways radical – in line with the 
traditions of Italian autonomy – but as a guide to practical 
action the book is almost empty.16
Klein, Starr and Hardt / Negri illustrate the complex 
interactions between activist and academic theorizing, and 
the tensions between their different purposes. These 
tensions appear above all in the shape of the theory – its 
active or contemplative form – rather than in its subject 
matter or ostensible political 'side'. Indeed, it could 
perhaps be said that the practice of the authors mentioned 
as individuals is at odds with their theorizing, to their 
credit as human beings and activists, if not as theorists. 
This is perhaps not surprising in a period of movement 
'upturn', in which practice can be expected to outstrip 
theory. But what does it imply for theorizing itself? 
 
The shadow lives of 'theory' 
Let’s return for a minute to the migration of movement 
activists to academia, and their creative contributions. 
Arguably two of the most creative contributions to the 
humanities and social sciences in recent decades have 
been those made by 'Marxism' and 'feminism'. Both of 
these are, in their origins, theories from and for 
movements. 
'Marxism' represents a particular crystallization of the 
theorizing processes of the workers’ movement. From the 
late 19th century it has formed one of the most important 
languages within which – and against which – movement 
debates have been framed (not only in left parties and 
trade unions, but also for example in the ecological and 
women’s movements). Its most famous ‘names’ are those 
of revolutionary activists, heavily involved in the various 
Internationals and suffering exile (Marx, Lenin, Lukács), 
political murder (Luxemburg, Trotsky) or imprisonment 
(Gramsci). 
'Feminism', similarly, represents a long-drawn-out 
process of theorization, which by the late 19th century had 
acquired some stability as a body of knowledge linked 
with ‘the first-wave women’s movement’, and which 
shares with Marxism the experience of a creative revival 
in the West associated with the social movements of the 
late 1960s and subsequently. It also shares something else 
                                                          
16 It also incidentally illustrates why Hardt and Negri may 
believe that people cannot communicate with one another…. 
with Marxism in this period, which is that of a migration 
into the academy. In part this is a reflection of movement 
success – the creation of departments of sociology and 
schools of women’s studies undoubtedly reflects a need on 
the part of the university to respond to (and benefit from) 
perceived changes within society. It is also, however, a 
reflection of movement weakness. 
This weakness is most obvious in the question of 'who 
controls' the institutions of Marxist and feminist 
theorizing. Both schools possess movement-controlled 
institutions, but the proportion of this theorizing which 
takes place within academic-controlled institutions, for 
primarily academic purposes and more or less according 
to academic rules, is striking. 
As theories migrate, they come to operate according to 
very different rules and purposes. This is obvious, for 
example, in the question of which theorists are quoted and 
for what purposes. Within Marxism, the practical radicals 
of the 1920s (with the partial exception of a largely 
misunderstood Gramsci) are abandoned in favour of the 
isolationists of the Frankfurt School. On a subtler level, 
Marxism and feminism tend to lose their aspect as theories 
of movement organization within the academic context, 
and to act simply as explanatory theories of social 
structure: theories of patriarchy and capitalism which 
often induce despair in students. While stressing the 
systematic nature of these structures, as activists also do in 
order to encourage more radical action, their academic 
versions lose precisely this focus on active opposition and 
wind up as forces for demobilization. 
Activist theorizing, then, produces a strange reflection 
– 'as in a camera obscura' (Marx and Engels 1846: 47) – of 
itself in academia. On the face of it, the language is often 
almost identical. But the things that are said in that 
language, and the kinds of conversations that take place, 
are very alien to its usage 'at home'. 
 
The 'new social movements' debate 
The 'new social movements' debate offers another 
illustration of this transformation of theory. In the 1960s 
and the 1970s, movement activists on the left struggled to 
engage with and understand a range of apparently 
connected phenomena: most obviously the rise of a ‘new 
Left’ which was critical both of Stalinism and of Social 
Democracy from a variety of anti-authoritarian 
standpoints; the increasingly obvious co-optation of the 
latter within the institutions of Cold War politics and their 
practical opposition to revolutionary movements (at least 
within the West); the growing significance of 'new social 
actors' – rural blacks in the United States, migrant workers 
in Italy, students in most Western countries; and the 
development of a range of movements and campaigns that 
were not easily captured by the institutional and 
intellectual frameworks of the Old Left – notably 
movements against nuclear power, women’s movements, 
urban squatters and movements against nuclear weapons.  
A significant body of literature was written in and 
around these movements, of varying quality and with 
varying political goals: in the 1960s its point was often an 
alignment with the revolutionary moment of '1968' against 
orthodox denials of its political potential; by the early 
1980s the point was often to support the development of 
Green parties or the 'greening' of the left wing of social 
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democratic and orthodox communist parties. In the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s, 'social movement theory' – itself 
often written in relation to some of the same movements – 
started to become aware of this literature, which (having 
lost its political significance with the increasing 
'mainstreaming' of Green parties) now became worth 
recuperating.  
Two important things happened to the theory at this 
point (Geoghegan and Cox 2001), both of them 
characteristic of what Alvin Gouldner (1971) describes as 
a 'scholastic' approach to theory, in other words one 
geared to the structural requirements of teaching, 
textbooks and literature reviews. Firstly, a contrast was 
constructed between 'new social movement theory' and 
'resource mobilization theory', in the process 
homogenizing the former considerably (and often 
restricting it to suitably 'academic' authors such as 
Touraine and Melucci). This contrast, repeated ad 
nauseam in introductions to edited collections and 
'overviews of the literature', was usually proposed as a 
debate between generic propositions à la Lofland: 
'resource mobilization theorists argue that…' while 'new 
social movements theorists argue that….' 
Secondly, the 'field' of social movements theory was 
expanded considerably (on a practical level, this enabled 
its construction as an 'international' field, since RMT was 
held to be 'American' and NSMT to be 'European') by the 
construction of a synthesis on the basis of the belated 
recognition that the two theories were in fact talking about 
different things. As Cohen (1985) put it, NSMT offered a 
'why' and RMT a 'how'.  
What was obscured most decisively in this process was 
the key political issue around which the literature had 
originally been constructed: the failure of social 
democracy to bring about revolutionary change in post-
war western Europe, and the alignment of orthodox 
communism with the repression of revolution in Paris just 
as much as in Prague.  
Where this 'historical background' – as it had 
significantly become from the viewpoint of academic 
theorizing – was recognized, it was used to say that NSM 
was a critique of ‘Marxism’ - thereby accepting the 
Stalinist claim to be the true guardians of Marxist 
authenticity, much as 'post-structuralists', reacting against 
the Althusserian legacy of PCF theology, often phrase 
their critiques as critiques of 'Marxism' tout court.  
In the process, the banal but nevertheless significant 
point that by the 1970s the PCF was increasingly isolated 
within Marxism was conveniently forgotten. When 
teaching students, it is of course far easier to say 'Marxists 
said this, but new social movements theorists (or post-
structuralists) said that', providing the illusion of an 
intellectual debate, than to recognize that what was 
originally at stake was initially a debate between Marxists 
over practical questions. For example: did 1968 represent 
a revolutionary moment in Paris or Prague? was it 
important to be present in student movements or should all 
energies should go into factory work? were movements 
against nuclear power a diversion from real issues or a 
significant new form of struggle? and did green parties 
represent a worthwhile strategy for expressing and 
radicalizing a range of struggles or a means for their co-
optation. 
To recognize this history would mean not only going 
into far greater depth in the history of ideas than one could 
expect of undergraduates – or political scientists! – it 
would also mean dethroning of purely cognitive analysis 
and recognizing that these theoretical struggles were 
organized not in terms of the clash of generic propositions 





2. ACTIVIST THEORIZING 
 
Having sketched out some of the contrasts and 
relationships between academic and activist forms of 
movement theorizing in the first part of this paper, we 
now want to look more closely at activist theorizing on its 
own terms. What is it? How does it relate to its social 
context? Why is it 'theory'? 
 
The dimensions of activist theory 
 
Eyerman and Jamison (1991) famously offer an analysis 
of social movements in terms of 'cognitive praxis' . An 
integral aspect of social movements, in other words, is the 
combination of skills and intentions which mark them as 
truly human. In Marx’s words: 
What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of 
bees is that the architect builds the cell in in his mind 
before he constructs it in wax…. (Marx 1867: 283-4)  
This is, however, not unique to social movements. 
Eyerman and Jamison argue, with examples from 
environmental movements, that activist theorizing falls 
into three categories: a cosmological dimension, 
consisting of worldview, historical meaning, emancipatory 
goals, etc.; a technological dimension, consisting of 
specific movement relationships to technological and 
technical activity; and an organizational dimension, 
consisting of the structural and communicative forms that 
movement activity takes (66-70).  
These concepts ultimately derive from what they 
describe as 'ahistorical, or transcendental' concepts in 
Habermas’ sociology of knowledge, which they claim to 
have 'transformed … into historical terms … specifiable 
interests or types of knowledge that particular movements 
could be seen to have articulated' (68). But have they been 
successful in this?  
 
Are all movements divided in three parts? 
Two out of their three dimensions are in a sense 
'necessary' aspects of social movements. First, movements 
as social institutions necessarily involve some form of 
organizational dimension, whether theorized as a separate 
skill (see Cox 1998) or thoroughly embedded in existing 
cultural forms. Second, if we are right to say that reflexive 
intentionality, thinking about what you are doing, is in 
some way characteristic of human activity (however badly 
or indirectly it may be carried out), then presumably some 
kind of cosmological dimension is also present. 
'Common worldview assumptions' may not be stated 
explicitly, but any social science notion of 'rationality' 
(Weber 1984) implies that at some level we can usefully 
describe actors as holding implicit assumptions about the 
nature of the world that they operate within. Certainly it is 
a normal part of activist life to argue about how the world 
works: to point to assumptions about e.g. 'ordinary 
people', 'the media', 'the police', 'our members' or whatever 
as a foundation for claims about what we should do. Some 
level of cognitive praxis related to the 'cosmological', then, 
is certainly present in the experience of activism, even 
though it is often manifested in disagreements about the 
nature of the 'cosmos' activists operate in.  
 
Does not compute, captain! 
But what of the technological dimension? 
Eyerman and Jamison have no difficulty showing its 
relevance for environmental movements, which of course 
routinely involve critiques of technological projects, to 
such an extent that movement activists often become 
'alternative experts' as well as calling on mainstream 
scientists to lend their voices; such movements also often 
involve proposals for 'alternative technology'. What of the 
other movements they discuss? 
In relation to nineteenth-century workers’ movements, 
they have to rephrase what they actually mean by 
'technological', thus:  
the problem was not technology itself so much as the 
organizing principle of technology… As Thompson 
put it, ‘What was at issue was not so much the machine 
as the profit-motive’. (83)  
In other words, although there was critical thought 
about the uses and control of technology, it is stretching a 
point to describe the early workers’ movement as having a 
separate dimension of technological cognitive praxis. 
When they come to describe the Civil Rights 
Movement in the US, the phrase becomes even more 
metaphorical:  
The technical dimension of the civil rights movement’s 
cognitive praxis consists of the specific objects of 
opposition and, even more importantly, the tactics, the 
techniques of protest, by which those objects were 
opposed. (123) 
It is at best forcing a point to equate interest in 
alternative technology, critique of the profit motive, and 
training in non-violent direct action as equally 
'technological' – particularly when this is contrasted to e.g. 
the 'cosmological' dimension. Environmentalists' critiques 
of technology are often inextricably linked with their 
'cosmological' analysis of what is wrong with the current 
industrial system and what an alternative society would be 
like (for a classic example, see Croall and Sempler 1978). 
Similarly, the 'cosmology' of the workers’ movement and 
the critique of the profit motive can hardly be separated. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, Geoghegan’s (2000) research on 
Irish working-class community politics found it difficult to 
operationalize Eyerman and Jamison’s 'technological' 
dimension on their own terms. 
 
Cosmology and organization 
Returning to the other two dimensions – cosmology and 
organization – are these necessarily and always separated 
from each other? The short answer is no,  in that 
movements often seek to embed the one within the other: 
to create a ‘beloved community’ of activists, or to carry 
out ‘a revolution within the revolution’17. 
In other movements again, the relationship between 
ends and means is a matter for significant contention, and 
one which (in for example die Grünen, or the workers’ 
movement in the early 20th century) may itself be a central 
structuring principle for movement divisions. To take a 
                                                          
17 For the activists Geoghegan (2000) talked to, the way in 
which they organize couldn’t be separated from an informed 
critique of the institutions they opposed. By contrast, there is a 
sharp gap in environmental movements between ‘how to lock 
on’ and ‘the importance for biodiversity of this particular SSI’, 
in terms both of the structure of knowledge (crudely, bottom-up 
versus top-down) and of audience (activists versus the public). 
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classic example, while the 'Kautskyite' line in German 
Social Democracy may have represented a divorce 
between a cosmological 'theory' and an organizational 
‘practice’, both Bernstein and Rosa Luxemburg sought, in 
very different ways, to create a more coherent unity. 
Contra the Michels – Weber assumption of an 
essential conflict between ends and means, we might 
suggest that the abstraction of a cosmological and moral 
dimension from other elements of movement activity is 
related to the situation of a movement seeking to co-opt 
(or be co-opted by) the state. In such a situation, a sharp 
division may occur between an increasingly instrumental 
technology of 'organization' and the appeal to the 
'mediation' of the state – whether by an appeal to 
'enlightened despots' or 'the public'.  
There is then an extent to which Eyerman and 
Jamison’s compartmentalization reproduces – to take an 
example not entirely at random – much of the postwar 
history of European Social Democracy, with its attempt to 
juggle internal 'machine politics' with the 'media gurus' 
deemed necessary to attract the floating voter.  
In more active movements, rather than 'cosmology' 
determining 'action', people often radicalize their 
understanding of how the world works through the 
process of conflict with adversaries and the attempt to 
convince the unconvinced; the 'programme' similarly is 
something which is often implicit in the choice of 
particular battles over others, the formation of particular 
alliances, and the creation of alternative social relations – 
what Fantasia (1988) has memorably called 'cultures of 
solidarity'.  
To abstract the 'cosmological' is of course also to 
present movements in the form in which they can be most 
easily appropriated by 'traditional' intellectuals of all kinds 
– not only the academic discussion of e.g. the 'philosophy' 
of the ecology movement, but also the policy-maker’s 
cooptation of a 'green agenda' when environmentalists 
push strongly enough.  
The boundaries between Eyerman and Jamison’s 
'dimensions of cognitive praxis', then, are themselves as 
'ahistorical and transcendental' as Habermas, albeit 
attractive from a particular 'contemplative', 'traditional' 
position which is interested in categorizing movement 
behaviour. Real-life thought, however, is a complex 
process of struggle which does not always sit neatly 
within these separate boxes. 
 
Are movements themselves separate? 
There is perhaps also a deeper criticism to be made: that it 
is itself a historical and sociological question whether it 
makes sense to distinguish a separate dimension of the 
cognitive praxis of movements from the rest of life. 
Lichterman (1996), contrasting the largely white and 
middle-class US Greens with black and Latina anti-toxics 
campaigners, noted that the former in effect constituted 
and understood themselves as an intentional community', 
alienated from their own social background and in conflict 
with important aspects of its assumptions. By contrast, the 
latter understood themselves as part of broader ethnic (and 
class) communities: they did not, that is, necessarily 
separate the thought processes involved in 'being activists' 
from those involved in e.g. 'being black'.  
Similarly, Irish working-class community organizers 
may refuse the term 'activist' as referring to something 
alien to the everyday life and culture of the communities 
they see themselves as part of – while nevertheless being 
involved in processes of discussion, disagreement, conflict 
and education within those communities. In these cases, 
people are involved in a struggle over the meaning of 
everyday culture, and may set limits on the extent to 
which movement discourses are allowed to develop 
independently.   
 
What kinds of jobs does activist theory do? 
 
In order to begin answering this question, we consider 
three examples: an anarchist website, a couple of studies 
of strikes, and materials from the history of SNCC. 
 
(a) The Anarchist FAQ 
 
The Anarchist FAQ (2000) is a specific document of 
'activist theory'. An FAQ is a list of 'frequently-asked 
questions', often developed for newcomers to an Internet 
newsgroup or mailing list by more experienced 
participants. It is a tool for the transfer of skills and 
understanding, of a kind which Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) identify as fundamental to the successful creation 
of a social institution. 
The Anarchist FAQ, in fact, goes rather beyond this. 
Its primary location is not a newsgroup but a website 
<www.anarchistfaq.org>, and printed versions are sold by 
anarchist groups and distributed by anarchist publishing 
networks. Rather than introduce people to a mailing list, it 
introduces people to anarchism. The document itself is 
produced (it is in constant development) by a number of 
reasonably well-known anarchist activists.  
In its production and distribution, then, it is activist 
theorizing rather than academic, and this also holds true 
for its reception: academic discussions of anarchism 
(including those by anarchist activists) tend to prefer to 
focus on 'dead classics' or the more abstract-minded 
activists such as Murray Bookchin or Hakim Bey; by 
contrast, the Anarchist FAQ is quoted in discussions on 
newsgroups and mailing lists unrelated to anarchism or 
academia18, in the context of essentially political 
arguments about anarchism.  
We have taken the Anarchist FAQ as a site which 
assembles in one place a range of issues which are very 
familiar to activists and which are also addressed 
differently in a host of literature produced by other styles 
of thinking and activism.  
 
What do activists do when they theorize? 
In fact, the answer is 'lots of things, many of them 
simultaneously.19
Firstly, there is a very explicit original purpose; 
according to the intro the document mushroomed from the 
need to argue that 'anarcho-capitalists' ('libertarians' in the 
American sense of the word) are not true anarchists at all, 
and that anarchism necessarily involves a rejection of 
                                                          
18 Thanks are due to Anna Mazzoldi for this information. 
19 The analysis below is restricted to the first section of the 
FAQ, which runs to 107 pp. and is printed as a separate book. 
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capitalism. Here is then a struggle over movement 
boundaries, located primarily on the Internet, where these 
two kinds of 'anarchists' are most likely to conflict (since 
anarcho-capitalists are unlikely to be found in the same 
struggles as anti-capitalist anarchists). 
A second kind of purpose is evidently to distinguish 
anarchists from Marxists, in particular Trotskyists, who in 
Britain and Ireland at least are often the closest 
'competitors' for anarchist activists – both sharing an 
orientation towards radical struggle, but competing for 
members and the attention of other activists, conflicting 
over the direction of campaigns (in e.g. arguments over 
the role of the state and violence), and so on. These, then, 
are conflicts which are in a sense internal to movements 
(and the FAQ argues that both Marxism and anarchism are 
to be understood in the context of working-class 
opposition to capitalism). 
This involves a rather different kind of argument and 
material: not to argue that Marxists are not really on the 
left, but more along the lines of 'where have Marxists and 
anarchists come into conflict?', with much discussion of 
Kronstadt, Makhno, Spain, etc. From the way this is 
presented, it makes most sense as training material for 
newcomers: a sense of a history of opposition, long-
standing grievances, reasons why Marxists shouldn’t be 
trusted, etc. Interestingly, it is not primarily posed as a 
cosmological argument; in fact the section of the FAQ 
devoted to analyzing the theoretical disputes is still in 
progress. The arguments are those designed to convince 
radically-minded activists to throw in their lot with 
anarchists rather than Trotskyists, rather than to convince 
postgraduates to align themselves with anarchist theory. 
A third kind of purpose is to provide material for 
arguing in favour of anarchism in general, with people 
who are neither self-identified ‘anarchists’ nor necessarily 
activists of any kind: this consists of responses to common 
objections (e.g. human nature, the need for leaders etc.), 
put in the form of short, 'ready-to-use' arguments.  
Lastly, a fourth kind of purpose is to give people a 
sense of the differences within the anarchist tradition (or, 
we might say, the 'legitimate' anarchist tradition, given the 
first purpose), and simultaneously to encourage people 
who think of themselves as anarchists to locate themselves 
within that tradition. This is achieved not so much by 
rejecting e.g. individualist anarchism in favour of social 
anarchism (the authors’ own position) as by showing that 
social anarchists can agree with the educational, project-
building side of individual anarchism while also including 
revolutionary elements. A similar operation is carried out 
with ‘cultural anarchism’. 
 
Activist theorizing as dialogue 
So here, within a single bit of activist theorizing, are four 
separate purposes. They do not split neatly into the 
cosmological', the 'technological' and the 'organizational', 
but in fact routinely combine these within a single 
passage. All are dialogical – they are all geared towards 
conversations – and they are all active – these are all 
conversations with a purpose. 
Some of the material in the FAQ is oriented towards 
'movement insiders', whether as newcomers (the history of 
conflict with Marxists) or those already involved (the 
different branches of 'legitimate' anarchism); some are 
meant as fodder for arguments with 'movement opponents' 
(arguments against anarcho-capitalism) or with the 
uncommitted (arguments about the viability of anarchist 
societies etc.). 
These are of course not neatly separated, but rather run 
through the whole document, as different kinds of rhetoric 
drawn on at different times for different purposes. 
However – and here the scholastic separation of different 
forms of 'cognitive praxis' breaks down – in practice most 
activists find themselves needing to do most of these at 
one point or another. Within any given campaign, there is 
a work of persuading the uncommitted to take sides, 
which is often linked to countering the arguments made by 
opponents. There is also a process of conflict over the 
direction of a movement, which involves countering 
'internal opponents' at the same time as trying to sway 
other activists with looser factional or organizational 
commitments.  
 
Positions and practice 
Most importantly, as Thompson (1977) observed, all of 
this has to be done by real people, and it is no surprise that 
activists who are trying to argue on so many different 
fronts simultaneously feel a need to clarify their own basic 
position (the strands within legitimate anarchism) while 
retaining an ability to draw on other positions when the 
situation demands it. The process of dialogue is not simply 
one between isolated individuals, but is one that goes on 
within activists’ own heads (and lives!), as they move 
from being uncommitted (or indeed actively hostile) to 
taking part, making choices and working out where they 
themselves stand – in a constant process of movement 
dialogue. 
Forms of theorizing such as the Anarchist FAQ 
represent one aspect of this process. Necessarily, the FAQ 
covers general arguments rather than concrete ones. Some 
of the sharpest arguments at present within campaigns in 
Britain and Ireland are about who is permitted to 
participate in decisional bodies planning events, whether 
decision-making should be monopolized, who should be 
included or excluded at meetings, etc.  These present 
another side of the 'anarchists versus Trotskyists' 
argument, presented now in terms of the situationally-
determined question 'What is to be done here and now?' 
rather than the more general question 'What are good ways 
of doing things?'20
Activists themselves have to respond to both kinds of 
questions. On the one hand, they draw on general ideas of 
best practice, historical precedents, organizational 
principles, the relationship between ends and means etc., 
to think how they should respond to immediate questions. 
On the other hand, their sense of what the present situation 
demands often stands in tension with the general ideas that 
they officially give allegiance to.  
Movement histories often prefer 'top-down' versions of 
events, in which the 'anarchist line', 'feminists', 'Marxist 
organizations' etc. are presented as the crucial actors. 
Arguably, though, this is to put the cart before the horse. 
Over time, people become anarchists, feminists or 
Marxists because they give particular kinds of answer to 
                                                          
20 Another contemporary situational example of this conflict 
appears in arguments over the ‘Black Bloc’. 
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the question 'What is to be done?', and find themselves 
agreeing with some activists’ suggestions and disagreeing 
with others. 
This is particularly important to understanding two 
central processes in social movements. Firstly, movements 
mobilize people who were not necessarily previously 
active. Of course those people do not come to activism 
with a blank slate – they may be from Christian or trade 
union backgrounds, republican families or liberal 
universities, and these facts are certainly important in their 
response. But it is a mistake to think that people simply 
impose their previous understandings on the situation they 
encounter as activists. They may draw on them as a 
resource, but inevitably those understandings will be 
lacking in answers for at least some of the problems that 
activism presents them with, and more importantly they 
may not be carriers of a ‘how-to’ knowledge of practical 
skills.  
Secondly, social movements often radicalize people 
who were previously content with a view of the world 
designed for situations of relative quiescence. When 
people are by and large accepting of the world and their 
place in it, what they need are stories that justify this and 
tools that enable them to survive without making 
concerted challenges to the world and their previous ideas. 
When people find themselves confronted with structures 
and institutions that they see as immediately and actively 
hostile to them, these stories and tools become less than 
useful. This is a well-known aspect of movement 
experience, worth exploring in slightly more depth. 
 
(b) Striking stories 
 
Fantasia (1988) and Dix (1999) offer detailed narratives of 
what happens when workers decide to change things in the 
workplace. We draw on these to suggest the need to shift 
attention away from the 'general' level of theorizing to the 
more concrete problems activists face situationally, when 
they have to decide what to do. Both studies show what 
Klandermans (1992) terms 'consciousness raising during 
episodes of collective action'. 
From Fantasia's three studies of American strikes we 
look at a moment in a wildcat strike in a New Jersey 
foundry. Dix examines a single day during a three-month 
civil servants' strike in Leeds. The situations vary 
enormously, but they share something in common. 
Most participants are not expecting the scale and the 
nature of the conflict they encounter. Their inherited 
knowledge is useful, but does not tell them 'what is to be 
done' in the specific situations they find themselves in. 
Rather, they have to argue about this, fumble their way 
forward, listen to different proposals – and then make their 
minds up. 'What should we do?' is anything but an easy 
question to answer in the circumstances of social 
movement struggles. 
Fantasia describes the ten to fifteen minutes before the 
decision to strike: 
The break-room atmosphere was noticeably sullen 
during lunch in the finishing department … there 
seemed to be a general feeling of resignation. But 
during the lunch break the maintenance department 
workers apparently had discussed the possibility of a 
walkout … a finishing department welder … was 
moving from work station to work station, motioning 
and shouting, ‘Shut it down’… [T]here was definite 
hesitation on the part of many at this initial stage of the 
action. A walkout was clearly ‘illegal’ according to the 
union contract, and the men faced certain dismissal if 
they were unsuccessful. (82–3) 
He goes on to discuss the way workers moved 
physically so as to align themselves with those walking 
out, to stay close to their machines or to adopt positions of 
partial commitment, along with the theoretical activity 
carried out not only by the committed workers but also by 
the foreman. Thus those committed to the strike plan 
engaged 'in almost desperate coaxing and pleading to 
[partially committed] workers, as well as heated 
explanations of the issue going on … to show those who 
were ‘hanging back’ that they could challenge the 
company and that the group was strong enough to express 
its defiance' (84–5). Meanwhile the foreman 'was dealing 
with different groups differently at this point in an effort 
to dissuade the more hesitant, isolate the more committed, 
and prevent unity' (83). 
Dix (1999) shows different groups within the union 
arguing for different strategies, two weeks into a strike: 
the Deputy Secretary General, the Section Executive 
Committee, members of the Socialist Workers’ Party, a 
member of the Broad Left 84 faction, three separate 
branch offices – and over 100 active strikers! She 
describes the different and shifting answers offered to the 
question ‘What is to be done?’ in this context: 
The SEC were in the driving seat and we were 
passengers. We were happy to be passengers until it 
became clear that the SEC plan to save the strike did 
not involve the majority of the rank and file…. The 
Stockport office however took our plans further…. We 
decided to jump on their bandwagon… A different 
‘what is to be done?’ meanwhile was taking shape on 
the opposite side of the strike office… (4–5)  
She illustrates the workings of this in concrete practice: 
The SEC, to ensure that key activists missed the lobby 
[of the Deputy Secretary General], so containing its 
size and impact, had deliberately delayed this 
meeting…. It appeared that the role of the rank and file 
in this matter was over. Until, that is, the SEC 
inadvertently threw the reins back to the rank and file 
activists…. A smaller lobby raged on outside section 
office as the SEC debated with Churchard [the DSG] 
over the fate of the strike. This was followed by an 
occupation of section office when Churchard failed to 
show for the audience with Leeds, culminating in 
approximately 30 strikers marching the union 'leader’ 
across town, back to the pub where more strikers lay in 
wait. Here, a top union official was made to answer to 
his members, a lonely man surrounded by over 100 
tired, angry strikers cramped into a smoke filled room. 
Churchard was made to make a dramatic U-turn. The 
strike had been saved…. (2–3) 
In both examples, we see 'leadership' – and thus 
intellectual activity - almost being tossed from hand to 
hand and mouth to mouth. Different people and groups 
offer different answers to the question ‘what is to be 
done?’, involving different interpretations of the situation, 
attempts to create different kinds of interaction, attempts 
to assert different kinds of organizational reality, etc.  
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Nor are these fixed – while some actors remain 
committed to a particular 'line' throughout, others change 
their position as the story progresses, create new alliances, 
talk in different ways in different contexts, etc. What 
determines the outcomes in each case is not abstract 
principles, but the way in which participants draw on 
these, more or less convincingly, to win others to 
agreement, propose counter-possibilities, go one step 
beyond, follow hesitantly, etc. The intellectual interplay is 
furious, engaged and creative. 
Within social movement studies, our impression is that 
there are few systematic accounts of the ways that activists 
actually develop ideas.21 We turn to the history of SNCC 
to explore this question a little further. 
 
(c) The case of SNCC: a 'borning organization?' 
 
SNCC, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, 
was born out of a wave of sit-ins organized by black 
American college students across the South during the 
early months of 1960. Bernice Johnson Reagon (cit Payne 
1995) called the US civil rights movement the 'borning 
movement' of the 1960s, and Payne suggests that SNCC 
itself was 'the borning organization' of the same period. 
Out of it came, first, attempts at new models of activism, 
leadership and organization, which themselves influenced 
the practice and thinking of the early student movement 
(notably SDS), the anti-war movement, the women's 
movement, and others. Later in its development, SNCC 
also played a major part in giving birth to the idea of 
'black power'. Within SNCC, too, one of the first position 
papers announcing the birth of 'second-wave feminism' 
was written. It is thus doubly possible to trace the roots of 
'identity politics' within SNCC. Although never a very 
large organization, SNCC's history represents a critical 
hinge in the development of radicalism after 1960, and in 
that sense we are still living in its wake. SNCC thus 
certainly conforms to Eyerman and Jamison's idea that 
movements themselves engage in 'cognitive praxis', and 
contribute largely to the remaking of ideas across the 
whole of society, including the academic sphere.22
However, that 'external' emphasis tells us little about 
the theoretical problems that SNCC activists themselves 
faced, and how they attempted to solve them. Rather than 
attempt a history of SNCC here, we pick out a number of 
illustrative themes.23
 
                                                          
                                                          
21 Are there studies which explicitly focus on the question of 
how activists theorize in the course of their struggles? The only 
work we can immediately think of that comes at all close to this 
are Marc Steinberg's studies of early 19th-century weavers and 
spinners' struggles (e.g. Steinberg 1999) and Robin Wagner-
Pacifici's (2000) studies of, of all things, the FBI faced with 
'standoff' crises like Waco.  
22  As we suggested above, without the movements of the 
1960s it is doubtful that academic study programmes would 
include such disciplinary fields as 'Black Studies' or 'Women's 
Studies'. 
23 The key source used here is Clayborne Carson, 1995, In 
Struggle. SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2nd edition. Page 
references to this work within this section of the paper are 
denoted by square brackets. Other sources are indicated in 
curved brackets. 
A philosophy of activism 
The students and former students who were attracted to 
SNCC in its early years were drawn by its perspective on 
activism, especially as enunciated by Ella Baker (and, 
Payne 1995 adds, Septima Clark). Baker had been 
working for Martin Luther King's Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC), and persuaded that body 
to fund publicity for the student conference in the spring 
of 1960 which gave birth to SNCC.  
What was needed, Baker urged, was an organization 
involving 'the development of people who are interested 
not in being leaders as much as in developing leadership 
among other people'24 [20]. Baker's ideas about practice 
stressed the need to involve others in developing their own 
ideas about the struggle, its forms and its goals. Payne 
offers a brief characterization of what he terms the 
'community-organizing tradition': 'the developmental 
perspective, an emphasis on building relationships, respect 
for collective leadership, for bottom-up change, the 
expansive sense of how democracy ought to operate in 
everyday life, the emphasis on building for the long haul, 
the anti-bureaucratic ethos, the preference for addressing 
local issues' (Payne 1995: 364). This tradition was thus 
distinguished from other models which, for example, 
sought to mobilize people behind an already developed 
programme of activities, which substituted an 
organization's own activities for those of the oppressed, or 
which engaged chiefly in propaganda. The approach 
demanded a high degree of patient discussion with people 
who were often fearful and doubtful of their own 
capacities, entailed a notion that people involved in 
steering their own struggles could develop their powers 
and self-confidence, and thus required a fundamentally 
facilitative style of leadership. 
SNCC's adoption and development of these ideas 
would make it distinctive within the civil rights movement 
as a whole, both in terms of the activities it undertook and 
the form of organization it adopted. Their application 
would push SNCC in specific directions, open up new 
lines of conflict within the civil rights movement as a 
whole, and set up a whole series of practical-theoretical 
problems for SNCC itself. 
Such a perspective is not adopted in abstraction from 
existing practices and social relations. Baker herself 
developed her ideas partly in contra-distinction to her 
experiences with the practices of the 'top-down' SCLC 
(see also Robnett 1997). From the start, SNCC 
distinguished itself and its methods from other models of 
activism within the movement. James Lawson called the 
student sit-ins of 1960 'a judgment upon middle-class 
conventional, half-way efforts to deal with radical social 
evil', criticizing the NAACP in particular for its 'fund 
raising and court action rather than developing our 
greatest resource, a people no longer the victims of racial 
evil who can act in a disciplined manner to implement the 
constitution' [23]. SNCC thus adopted 'community 
organizing' in a self-aware theorization both of itself and 
also of other bodies against whom it measured itself, and 
24  This, she suggested in a sideswipe at King and the SCLC, 
would protect activists against the disillusionment that comes 
'when the prophetic leader turns out to have heavy feet of clay.' 
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with whom it was involved in complex combinations of 
collaboration and conflict. 
SNCC's 'theory of practice' was partly shaped by its 
view of the basic nature of the problem facing black 
people in the deep South, that they were denied not simply 
'rights' but the self-enhancing attributes of full 
citizenship.25 As Polletta (1994) suggests, SNCC's aims 
could be encompassed neither by the (essentially liberal) 
idea of securing integration, nor by the notions of 
'prefigurative' politics: 'SNCC workers saw their goal .... 
as organizing and securing recognition for 
disenfranchized, 'unqualified' southern blacks as legitimate 
political leaders. Such a recognition, they believed, would 
compel a fundamental alteration of national and local 
politics by toppling institutionalized understanding of 
legitimate black leadership' (1994: 88). That implied a 
goal of assisting poor local black communities to empower 
themselves by engaging in self-organized forms of 
collective struggle. Activists as well as those they 
encouraged to mobilize could be expected to make gains 
in dignity and self-respect as well as in rights and material 
advantages.26  
Thus the style and goals of SNCC's activism were 
predicated both on a specific reading of American society 
and its problems, and on a search for a collective actor 
(initially, poor southern black communities) whose 
practical agency should be fundamental to solving them. 
This philosophy of activism, itself at once a critique of 
other way of organizing and a model to be followed, 
would be put to severe practical tests over the next years, 
as activists explored its possibilities and also its limits. 
 
An organizational form 
Inspired by this theory of practice, SNCC adopted a 
particular organizational character. On paper, it remained 
for a time a campus-based student body founded in the sit-
in movement of 1960, but in practice it became what 
Piven and Cloward (1977) term a 'cadre organization' 
composed of full-time organizers, working on very low 
pay, who fanned out in small groups across the deep South 
and involved themselves in mobilizing local struggles. 
While the student movement proper had gone into decline, 
SNCC was transforming itself into a body composed 
largely of former students who were now full-time field 
secretaries functioning as spearheads of militant anti-racist 
struggle in the deep South, and developing its own 
autonomous ways of recruiting personnel, acting, thinking 
and organizing [31-50]. 
After its October 1960 conference - smaller than that 
in the spring, but composed more of 'hard-core activists' - 
SNCC took on a clearer organizational shape, establishing 
a delegate-based Coordinating Committee (CC) but at the 
same time insisting that local groups would remain 
autonomous.  From the start, SNCC was marked by a 
                                                          
                                                          
25  Robnett (1997) notes the kinship between these ideas and 
those of the radical educationist, Paolo Freire. 
26  The movement should liberate not only those it addressed, 
but also its own activists. As Marion Barry of SNCC explained, 
'(I was) not a free man... not a man at all... only part of a man... I 
felt that in order to become a whole man I must be an American 
citizen as anybody else' [21]. See also Robnett (1997) for 
discussion of the complex implications of male SNCC activists' 
search for manhood. 
resistance to the forms of hierarchical control that marked 
other civil rights organizations, insisting that SNCC could 
speak for the movement 'in a cautious manner in which it 
is made quite clear that SNCC does not control local 
groups' [30]. 
 As Robnett (1977) suggests, SNCC's activist 
philosophy and organizational form had an important side-
effect. While it provided less space for 'big leaders', it 
opened a larger organizational space for the development 
of 'bridge leaders'27 - including women who were rather 
excluded from formal leadership roles by the predominant 
sexism of the SCLC (see also Johnson 2001). It was Baker 
and Clark, black women activists, who provided much of 
the early theorization of SNCC's perspectives, and women 
organizers played a much more prominent part in SNCC's 
activity and debates than, for example, in the minister-led 
SCLC.  
Implementing Baker's ideas entailed the development 
of an autonomous and increasingly self-directed 
leadership organization, developing its own theoretical 
practice in dialogue with southern blacks and at some 
distance from the cultural pressures of student politics. Its 
form permitted the promotion and development of 
'movement intellectuals' drawn from social categories 
whom other forms excluded. Its relative independence 
would give it a capacity for swift learning and flexibility 
of response, but also a capacity to crumble quickly. 
 
Changing leadership rhetorics, finding an activist identity 
SNCC would then, proceeding through the fire of the 
black liberation movement of the 1960s, test out its ideas 
in practice, and several times reshape itself and its 
practice. In that process of development, leadership would 
pass from one grouping to another. 
In the first phase of development, an already relatively 
experienced grouping of students from Nashville played 
the leading role. They insisted on SNCC's adoption of 
nonviolent direct action as a method, establishing rules for 
the conduct of such action. This group tended to develop a 
religiously-based rhetoric to account both for their actions 
and their goals.28 Later in 1960 the Nashville group's 
influence waned, and SNCC speakers deployed a more 
secular and more political tone, though without any 
reduction in radicalism or in the stress on nonviolent 
direct action. It took some time, in any case, for the 
fledgling organization to find its wings, and to establish its 
own direction.  
SNCC volunteers went to join a student protest in 
Rock Hill and get themselves jailed, they joined in the 
CORE-initiated Freedom Rides on Greyhound buses, and 
began to involve themselves in voter registration drives in 
Mississippi and elsewhere. Nominally, policy was still 
27 'Bridge leaders' were the vital connecting links between 
national movement organizations and their grassroots 
constituents, giving voice to the latter's needs, mobilizing and 
motivating them through close interpersonal work, promoting the 
radical tactics national leaders could or did not. 
28  Diane Nash saw the desegregation movement as 'applied 
religion'; James Lewis, a ministerial student, saw King as 'a 
Moses, using organized religion and the emotionalism within the 
Negro church as an instrument... towards freedom'; Lawson 
suggested their purpose was to force white southerners to face 
their 'sin'. [21-3] 
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being made by the CC, but in practice it was being 
determined on the ground through the actions of the field 
staff. Their activities were drawing them together into a 
new sense of group identity, founded on mutual respect 
and trust among the developing layer of professional 
militants who organized together, got beaten up together, 
went to jail together, sang and joked there together, and 
who both gained victories and suffered setbacks 
together.29 Their collective stance against the federal 
government became more radical, as they simultaneously 
charged it with hypocrisy and became aware that, as a 
determined minority, they could sometimes throw it into 
crisis [37-8]. 
 
An argument about strategy 
It was this increasingly cohesive group which faced its 
first significant argument over strategy. One wing, which 
had been central to the student protests and Freedom 
Rides, urged continuation of direct action protest tactics. 
The direct action group, possibly, was influenced by its 
own experience to date. The second group was drawn 
increasingly to the idea of pursuing voter registration in 
the deep South. One of its key spokespeople was Bob 
Moses, who - before he had even joined SNCC formally - 
went to Mississippi and there met Amzie Moore of the 
local NAACP. Moore got Moses to promise to return to 
Mississippi to help with a voter registration drive [25-7]. 
This meeting signaled the start of a turn towards the black 
struggle in Mississippi that would shape SNCC's future. 
Almost imperceptibly, initiative and innovation was being 
generated by new recruits, and by activists outside 
SNCC's own ranks. 
The direct action group was concerned that SNCC 
might be 'bought off' by federal government and by 
private foundation moneys, which were offered for voter 
registration work. Moses's grouping, by contrast, was 
taking note of what people on the ground were telling 
them about the importance of their issue. This second 
group saw an opportunity to 'transform small-scale non-
violent protest activities into a massive political struggle 
for racial advancement', and to win funds that might 
otherwise go to older and more moderate civil rights 
bodies [39]. The proponents of voting work were, says 
Carson, 'more articulate and had more of certain kinds of 
contact', and they had in any case already begun to take up 
voting registration work in Mississippi [40-1].  
The argument might have been the occasion for a split 
within SNCC. In practice, however, the issue was resolved 
through two parallel developments. Ella Baker made what 
was, for her, an unusually deliberate intervention in the 
debate, suggesting that SNCC form two wings, each 
pursuing one aspect of a shared strategy; and James 
Forman was appointed as an executive secretary who 
managed both to gain both sides' confidence, and to put 
fund-raising on a more secure footing. For the time being, 
SNCC had found a workable organizational form, and the 
                                                          
29  Charles Sherrod said about imprisonment: 'You get ideas 
in jail, You talk with other young people you've never seen. 
Right away we recognize each other. People like yourself, 
getting out of the past. We're up all night, sharing creativity, 
planning action. You learn the truth in prison, you learn 
wholeness. You find out the difference between being alive and 
being dead.' [33] 
issue that divided the two groups rather faded away in the 
light of further experience. 'The direct action proponents... 
discovered in McComb that their nonviolent tactics were 
not always effective and sometimes ruinous when used 
against a determined white establishment. They also 
discovered that voter registration in the deep South offered 
as much of a test of militancy and courage as did direct 
action protests.' As SNCC member Reginald Robinson put 
it: 'if you went into Mississippi and talked about voter 
registration they're going to hit you on the side of the head 
and that's as direct as you can get' [50]. 
The argument over strategy involved a complex of 
practical-intellectual issues: the risk of cooptation by 
federal and funding agencies on the one hand, as against a 
sense of opportunities for making advances in conjunction 
with local communities on the other; the organization's 
readiness to explore new tactics proposed by sections of 
the movement outside its own immediate ranks; the 
relative capacity of different groupings to formulate and 
persuasively articulate their arguments; the degree to 
which differences within SNCC could be argued without a 
falling out between proponents of different positions. 
SNCC was still finding its way forward, and the 
essentially experimental resolution of its debate both 
depended on and permitted a further development of 
mutuality and trust among the participants in the 
discussions. However, if that mutual trust, among activists 
fired by very moral commitments, were to break down, 
then strategic debates could - indeed, later would - take a 
very different turn. 
 
Learning by Doing - and its possible limits 
As it happened, the initial voter registration experiment in 
McComb, Mississippi, largely failed, but the experience 
taught the young activists, in Bob Moses's words, 
'something of what it took to run a voter registration 
campaign in Mississippi. We knew some of the obstacles 
we would have to face; we had some general idea of what 
had to be done to get such a campaign started.. And we 
began to set about doing this' [50]. Their largely defeated 
effort at intervention in McComb taught them better how 
to appreciate the difficulties faced by local blacks, the 
strength (and brutality) of their opponents, and some sense 
of the kinds of tactics by which the worst difficulties 
might be overcome. That learning process continued over 
the next period. SNCC activists were meeting and having 
to deal with fear among those they sought to mobilize: 
Charles Sherrod reported black people who would cross 
the street to avoid contact with SNCC organizers. Their 
objective included removing 'mental block in the minds of 
those who wanted to move but were unable for fear that 
we were not who we said we were' [57]. They were 
learning that they had to talk patiently to people on their 
porches in rural areas, in poolrooms and bars as well as 
churches in the towns, and thus they needed to get to 
know the social structures and inner class and other 
tensions of black communities as a condition of doing 
their work.  
The acquisition of skills and judgment, about how to 
relate to those they were seeking to mobilize but also how 
to relate to each other, about what might 'work' and what 
didn't, about how to relate means and ends effectively, 
was achieved through a reflexive method of 'learning by 
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doing' very characteristic of the 'craft' of organizing.  
James Forman later recalled: 
So long as we were working on voter registration and 
public accommodations, there was a broad consensus 
under which everyone could move. It seemed 
important then just to do, to act, as a means of 
overcoming the lethargy and hopelessness of so many 
black people. Also, we had no adequate models for 
what we were doing, for how we should proceed. 
Rather than set up rigid definitions of goals and tactics, 
it seemed best then to experiment and learn and 
experiment some more and draw conclusions from the 
process.' (Forman 1973: 238, cit Carson [54]) 
SNCC began to develop, by sharing and reflecting on 
its activists' experiences, a kind of 'cook book' of 
accumulated tactical lessons - of the practical kinds of 
theorizing that regularly mark movement intellectual 
activity. They developed a set of half-formalized 'standard 
operating procedures' of the kind that, as Wagner-Pacifici 
(2000: 149) notes, are commonly 'the calling cards of 
organizations'. 
Looking back, with the benefit of hindsight, Forman 
also noted that, on their return from McComb for 
discussions, SNCC activists were marked by a lack of 
discipline and political sophistication, notably in their 
refusal of any need for a programme of political education 
[50]. They were radicalized by their experiences - they 
now described themselves as 'revolutionary,' were more 
open to socialists who offered genuine aid and were 
exerting an ideological pull on white radical students [51-
4]. But few, as yet, saw any need for a general 
revolutionary ideology. They relied on the intense 
struggles in which they were involved to provide them 
with the necessary insights to continue their work. Thus 
their learning pattern was very different from, say, campus 
students coming to radical politics through exposure to 
general revolutionary ideas: they were, rather, testing and 
forming their ideas against the harsh realities of the 
Mississippi freedom struggle, learning about their 
collective abilities and about southern blacks of all classes. 
There's a case to be made that their 'refusal of political 
education' (rather like the 'refusal of strategy' that Breines 
attributes to the American New Left in the same decade30) 
would, later, contribute to SNCC's difficulties. Polletta 
(1984: 103-4) suggests that SNCC tended to adopt a 
'mystified, unitary notion of the black community' in ways 
that skated over some important questions about class 
divisions within actual black communities. Would a 
political education programme in SNCC have weakened 
this populist tendency in its members' thinking? It all 
depends, surely, what kind of programme, who prepared 
and delivered it, and how....  SNCC was building 
relationships with the (predominantly white) student New 
Left, but that New Left was very uncritical and adulatory 
about SNCC (Carson 177-9) and thus unlikely to provide 
useful sources of sympathetic criticism. 
 
Learning from setbacks? 
Movements, and their constituent organizations, often 
meet particular opportunities for theoretical development 
                                                          
                                                          
30  See Barker (2001); on a not dissimilar theme, also Epstein 
1991. 
when they face new conditions, and especially setbacks. 
McAdam (1999) and others have pointed to the civil rights 
movement's experiences in Albany, Georgia between 1961 
and 1962 as just such a learning experience. SNCC 
organizers laid much of the groundwork for the Albany 
Movement, talking to local people and organizing small 
protests at the train station where numbers of students 
were arrested, then launching their first mass meeting in a 
church, followed by a mass rally in support of the arrested 
students. Working now in a significant urban setting, they 
now had to face new issues, not least concerning their 
relationships with other civil rights organizations. King 
came to Albany and led a prayer march to City Hall, 
where he was arrested  Having first said that, like SNCC 
members, he would stay in jail, King allowed himself to 
be released on bail as part of a truce negotiated with the 
city authorities. The whole movement lost momentum as 
city officials stalled on the implementation of agreements. 
Efforts to revive the demonstrations achieved little but 
arrests and jail terms.  
Police Chief Pritchett was very ready to use official 
force to stop the demonstrations, but did so with politely 
controlled overt violence.31 A SNCC worker, Bill Hansen, 
commented, 'We were naive enough to think we could fill 
up the jails.... We ran out people before [Pritchett] ran out 
of jails' [61]. The Albany experience proved a serious 
setback for the whole civil rights movement. It showed 
that, by itself, a readiness to suffer through nonviolent 
direct action, even on a mass scale, was not sufficient to 
ensure federal intervention. The SCLC, as McAdam 
(1999) has shown, learned the lesson well, and applied it 
by going for a mass campaign the following year in 
Birmingham, Alabama,  where public exhibitions of police 
brutality compelled the Kennedy administration to 
intervene. Birmingham was a turning point in the national 
struggle for civil rights, but SNCC was not involved in the 
Birmingham events, and they seem to have learned less 
strategically from Albany. Julian Bond of SNCC proudly 
claimed that when SNCC left an area, it left behind 'a 
community movement with local leadership, not a new 
branch of SNCC' [62]. After Albany, SNCC workers 
became more hostile towards King, calling him 'De Lawd' 
[63]. They distinguished the way they worked from the 
SCLC, who had come into Albany and taken charge, 
dispensing patronage and the like. As Carson comments, 
however, while SNCC's methods endeared them to local 
blacks, they also 'reflected the tenuousness of SNCC's role 
in the expanding protest movement' [64]. In an important 
sense, SNCC partly flunked a test that King's SCLC rather 
more triumphantly passed after Albany, in that it was 
slower to learn 'something new' from significant events.32
 
31  Coretta King described Pritchett's tactics: 'He would allow 
the protestors to demonstrate up to a point. Then he would say, 
"Now we're going to break this up. If you don't disperse, you'll 
be arrested." Often they would refuse to disperse, and would 
drop on their knees and pray. Chief Pritchett would bow his head 
with them while they prayed. Then of course, he would arrest 
them and the people would go to jail singing.' (cit Bloom 1987: 
170) 
32  Shanin (1986) suggests the test of 'learning something 
new' to the thinkers (of left and right alike) who grappled with 
the implications of the 1905 Russian Revolution. 
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Needing to re-think 
The years 1962-3 saw SNCC consolidating and 
developing its work. It established permanent projects in 
many southern communities, gaining the support and trust 
of local black residents. Still possessing its characteristics 
of openness, informality and impetuousness, its contacts 
with poor southern blacks had developed in SNCC 
workers a new sense of commitment and social 
responsibility. At its national office, in Atlanta, James 
Forman ran a small-scale but effective office operation, 
organizing aid for the local field secretaries and spreading 
SNCC's publicity operation to reach hundreds of 
thousands of supporters. However, if SNCC's primary role 
was as a stimulus for mass protest in the deep South, 
efforts to register voters were 'cruelly unsuccessful' 
(Polletta 1984: 93). Local campaigns met with constant 
harassment and intimidation. Increasingly SNCC activists 
were recognizing that sporadic, local, small-scale 
nonviolent  protests, accompanied by lengthy jail terms for 
members and active supporters, were not going to succeed 
by themselves. They needed to think more widely, and to 
become some kind of political organization [69, 79]. Local 
events impelled them in this direction. The Leflore County 
(Mississippi) supervisors stopped supplies of food to poor 
blacks from the federal program, and SNCC organized a 
food drive involving its northern affiliates. Faced with 
extensive violence in Greenwood, they called in civil 
rights workers from outside to demonstrate in the city. 
Both these tactical innovations involved a shift away from 
local self-reliance and leadership [79-81]. Bob Moses and 
other SNCC members were coming to recognize that they 
must find ways of pressurizing the federal government to 
intervene in their support [81]. (In their own way, they 
were learning the lessons King had drawn from Albany.) 
Moses was also concluding that SNCC must modify and 
expand its goals: it was necessary, he argued, to begin a 
struggle for education in southern communities now, and 
to begin fighting not simply for the right to register as a 
voter under existing legislation but for 'one man one vote.' 
It took no large step for them to begin to see the necessity 
of economic goals as well. SNCC's experience on the 
ground was pushing it to move beyond the limits of the 
conventional civil rights agenda. 
As SNCC workers, faced with the slowness of their 
progress on the ground, became clearer that federal 
intervention was a vital requirement for success, they 
became ever more critical of what they saw as the 
Kennedy administration's 'hypocrisy' and lack of moral 
commitment to the civil rights cause. SNCC adopted more 
combative tactics, for example organizing sit-ins at the 
Justice Department in Washington. John Lewis's hard-
hitting draft speech at the 1963 march on Washington was 
censored in order to keep the Archbishop of Washington 
on the podium [93-5]. At the same time, though 
increasingly disillusioned with official white liberalism, 
SNCC's activist leaders were not yet ready to offer a 
coherent alternative worldview distilled from their 
practical experiences in the southern struggle [83-8]. 
SNCC's character was changing. What had been an 
organization of nonviolent activists seeking to appeal to 
'the nation's conscience' was now developing into 'a cadre 
of organizers seeking to mobilize blacks to coerce the 
federal government into using its power to achieve civil 
rights goals' [95] - an evolution paralleled in part by 
thinking in King's SCLC (McAdam 1999). 
Up to now, Bob Moses's strategy had involved relying 
chiefly on local black organizers, but recognizing that 
existing methods were not sufficiently successful33, he 
proposed that, in the summer of 1964, SNCC organize a 
massive invasion of Mississippi by northern white student 
volunteers. The proposal, when was taken up by a wider 
coalition of organizations, became 'Freedom Summer' [96; 
see also McAdam 1988].  
 
Disappointments and radicalization 
The intention behind 'Freedom Summer' was to force a 
confrontation between the Mississippi state authorities and 
the federal government, and thus to prevent the open 
intimidation and violence that had stymied civil rights 
work. Moses explained his plan as 'an annealing process. 
Only when metal has been brought to white heat, can it be 
shaped and molded. This is what we intend to do to the 
South and the country, bring them to white heat and then 
remold them' [98]. The organizers knew that there would 
be violence, and there was thus an element of 'cynicism' in 
the project [114]. (A former white student who did not 
join Freedom Summer told us, 'We all knew that some 
white students were going to have to die.') Indeed, even 
before the project was fully underway, three student 
volunteers (James Chaney, Andrew Goodman and 
Michael Schwerner, one black and two white) were 
murdered near Philadelphia, Mississippi. 
From the start, the Freedom Summer proposal met 
with opposition within SNCC. Some black members 
complained that whites tended to take over leadership 
roles, and that their involvement would reinforce 
traditional patterns of racial dependence. SNCC had 
become a magnet for a radicalizing layer of white 
students, who formed some 20 per cent of its staff by the 
fall of 1963. While the radical historian Howard Zinn 
(1965) saw this development in highly positive tones, 
others saw something darker occurring: there were racial 
outbursts at SNCC meetings, foreshadowing later 
developments [100-1]. Although efforts were made to 
recruit black volunteers for the summer project, the need 
for participants to pay their own way meant that Freedom 
Summer was dominated by white middle-class students. 
From the start, there were tensions between the white 
volunteers, whose experience of actual conditions in the 
South was minimal, and their black teachers and leaders 
[112-4]. 
Parallel with the involvement of student volunteers, 
SNCC promoted two other projects: a quite successful 
system of 'freedom schools' in black communities, and the 
promotion of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party 
(MFDP), set up to challenge the Democratic party's racist 
machine.  Freedom Summer did not succeed directly, in 
that no open confrontation between state and federal 
government ensued, though the project achieved wide 
news coverage. SNCC still hoped to make gains through 
the MFDP challenge at the Democratic Party convention 
in Atlantic City, but this failed when moderate civil rights 
leaders agreed to a 'compromise' which excluded the black 
                                                          
33  The Voter Education Project withdrew funding from the 
Mississippi projects, because of their low success rate. 
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delegates from Mississippi. SNCC veterans, especially, 
were embittered and disappointed. Stokely Carmichael 
commented that the whole experience showed 'not merely 
that the national conscience was generally unreliable but 
that, very specifically, black people in Mississippi and 
throughout this country could not rely on their so-called 
allies. Many labor, liberal and civil rights leaders deserted 
the MFDP because of closer ties to the national 
Democratic party' [128]. 
Freedom Summer had involved very ambitious 
projects that strained SNCC's human resources and 
relationships. The shift away from the slow bottom-up 
practice of 1962-3 to a large-scale attempted intervention 
into the national political agenda was in no way automatic: 
Moses' proposal had won support because it connected 
with numbers of activists' own experience of failure and 
frustration. Its relative failure sharpened SNCC's criticism 
of liberal America, pushing its workers to seek new kinds 
of solutions. 
Bitter experience can radicalize activists. But the 
general lessons they learn from it depend on theoretical 
developments which are not, directly, the outcome of their 
hardwon knowledge. Turning points in struggle, even 
when potentially favourable, can disorient as much as they 
can inspire creative new thought. 
 
Opportunity and crisis 
The years following Freedom Summer witnessed a 
heightening radicalization of movements in the United 
States. Black protest in the cities grew in intensity, 
peaking in the Detroit insurgency of the summer of 1967. 
Impulses from the civil rights movement, and especially 
from SNCC, lay behind the rise of the student movement 
that flared across the campuses from the fall of 1964.34 
The student revolt rapidly provided the impetus behind a 
rising movement opposing the American war in Vietnam, 
a movement whose spread into the active armed services 
themselves contributed hugely to the biggest shock the 
American military machine has ever experienced. 
Interwoven with that history was an immense revival of 
the women's liberation movement, which itself inspired 
the gay and lesbian movement in the 1970s.  
One might have expected that the later 1960s, when 
the 'cycle of protest' (Tarrow 1998) rose to its greatest 
peaks,  would provide a setting where SNCC's young 
radical activists' organization and influence would flourish 
and expand. Yet SNCC's history after Freedom Summer is 
better characterized as one of slow inner collapse. The 
'opportunities' beloved of structural theories are not, it 
seems, sufficient: a suitable combination of ideas and 
practice is required to seize them. 
 
Losing their way 
At meetings in the fall of 1964, SNCC met to evaluate its 
organization and its future tasks. The existing organization 
needed to be reshaped. A position paper in November 
1964 (probably by Bob Moses) described SNCC as a boat 
afloat on the ocean needing repair: to stay afloat they must 
repair it, to repair it they must stay afloat. One staff 
                                                          
34  The first speaker from the police car roof during the 
sitdown in Sproul Plaza at the Berkeley campus was Mario 
Savio, who had only recently returned from Freedom Summer. 
member commented that they had never decided if they 
wanted to be agitators, demonstrators, or organizers - 'and 
we can't fool ourselves into believing that we can be all 
three because we can't do it effectively' [142]. Payne's 
summary of the host of new questions that thrust 
themselves upon SNCC over the next couple of years if 
anything under-estimates their difficulties: 
SNCC was trying to resolve a staggering number of 
questions, many of them products of the organization's 
disillusionment with American society. What did 
‘integration’ mean, and was the country worth 
integrating into? How would it be possible to 
accommodate both the need of individual members for 
freedom of conscience and action and the need of the 
organization for discipline? What was the proper role 
of whites in the context of increasing race 
consciousness among Blacks? How is it possible to 
provide leadership without being manipulative? Is it 
possible to be both moral and politically effective? 
How could the organization speak to economic 
inequalities, rural and urban? If neither the federal 
government nor liberals could be trusted, where were 
the movement's allies? Could allies or models be found 
in the Third World? How should the organization 
respond to the anger in the urban ghettoes and the 
periodic violent uprisings it generated? What are the 
limits on what local leadership can accomplish? 
Should existing social structures be reformed or new 
ones created? What was to be the role of women in the 
movement? What should be the movement's position 
on Vietnam? (Payne 1995: 366)  
Those attending meetings in the fall of 1964 were tired 
- like people returning from wars, said Cleveland Sellers 
[138]; many were angry, suspicious, losing their 
perspective and their humour, and even their former trust 
for co-workers. The former mutual confidence and 
commitment was never recovered. Discussion of a 
Forman-Moses proposal, for a Black Belt Program to 
succeed Freedom Summer, was dominated by fractious 
procedural arguments about who had initiated the idea and 
what their motives were. Its proponents retreated: Forman 
never fully set forth a rationale for his actions, and Moses 
was reluctant to exercise open leadership [138-40]. 
Arguments dragged on, and at later meetings very 
contentious decisions (the replacement of the chair, and 
the exclusion of whites) were taken by a weary vote of 
those still remaining in meetings in the early hours of the 
morning. As the atmosphere of generalized mistrust grew, 
the possibility for SNCC to make creative advances 
shrank. 'Time and again, the substance of ideas could not 
be discussed because of a climate of suspicion and 
emotional strain, that the organization was unable to 
implement any new projects of even effectively maintain 
old ones. The climate would become progressively more 
debilitating.' While Forman reminded them of their initial 
character as 'a 'band of brothers, a circle of trust', the 
emotional bonds among them were weakening [146]. 
There emerged a situation of 'rigid, politicized factions, 
each quick to suspect the worst of the other factions.' This 
occurred in a context where SNCC 'was trying to reassess 
its entire program, respond to the morale problems caused 
by disillusion with liberal America and by the lingering 
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resentments over whether there should ever have even 
been a Summer Project' (Payne 1995: 368-9). 
For many SNCC workers, the core of their motivation 
for involvement lay in their membership of a very loosely 
structured community of activists, built round the activist 
philosophy of building popular confidence in struggle. 
SNCC's identity had been based, not on material rewards 
(SNCC workers received only ten dollars a week) or even 
political effectiveness, but on its life as a 'morally 
consistent activist community' [154]. Payne cites Bob 
Moses's important suggestion that its roots in the lives of 
local people had kept SNCC from going off on tangents; 
those roots provided a form of discipline, for they made 
activists behave in a manner acceptable within the moral 
code of rural and small-town communities of Mississippi 
(Payne 1995: 372-3). But after 1964, these relationships 
began to rip apart.  
Within southern black communities, local leaders 
began assuming control over local movements - as SNCC 
had always assumed it wanted - except that those 
emergent local leaders were often parochial and 
pragmatic. SNCC workers were becoming aware that local 
people were often motivated by apparently less idealist but 
concrete material issues like paved streets and better jobs 
[154-5]. Quite often, Payne reports, there were charges of 
'selling out', but it had anyway become more difficult to 
define what the movement was trying to achieve. 
'Skipping the cases of outright dishonesty, some of what 
was called selling out in 1968 would have been called 
progress had it happened in 1963.... What was selling-out 
from one perspective was just moving on from another, 
becoming a part of the structure so that one could change 
it even more.' (Payne 1995: 358). Federally funded 
welfare bodies were appearing on the scene in Mississippi, 
with a different ethos from SNCC's freedom schools and 
other projects:  
The original intention... was that [educational] centers 
would be connected with movement activity and 
imbued with movement values - a spirit of 
volunteerism, recognition of the need of the poor to 
represent themselves, minimal hierarchy, respect for 
the ability of the untrained to be trained, concern with 
teaching people how the issues that touch them are 
impinged upon by wider social issues. What they got 
under MAP [a federally supported programme] was an 
educational program dominated at best by a 
traditional-social-welfare mentality. Let's-have-some-
experts-do-something-for-poor-people. 
Reform, one might say, brought its own problems,  
creating 'a more morally ambiguous climate' surrounding 
many of SNCC's projects, and a sense in which cooptation 
and demoralization went together:  'It simply became 
harder to know what to believe in or whom to trust. Had it 
not been for the demoralization, it might have been more 
difficult for outside elites to coopt so much of the 
movement's energies.' (Payne 1995: 347, 360-1)  
While some SNCC members stayed with their projects, 
dissociating from SNCC, others responded to the sense of 
displacement by 'floating', searching for more meaningful 
roles while 'high on freedom', in turn causing others to 
demand more discipline within SNCC [154]. Internal 
disputes became more frequent. Cleveland Sellers opposed 
what he saw as a flamboyant faction of 'stars,... 
philosophers, existentialists, anarchists, floaters and 
freedom-high niggers,' who brought a disruptive element 
of what he saw as a fake intellectualism into planning 
meetings [155-6]. 
Later in the 1960s, the slogan 'the personal is political' 
would be coined. It could be usefully reversed: in radical 
movements, the political is often very personal. To lose a 
set of moral bearings and the confidence these induce is 
deeply disorienting. The strains of political engagement 
with shifting practical problems and working 
understandings demand, from those who would lead, both 
a coherent understanding of the changing ground and an 
attention to activists' own needs, along with a capacity to 
draw together the multiple and contradictory threads of 
hope and disappointment, altering alliances and 
organizational tensions into some convincing new 
trajectory that will maintain consent and continued 
participation. Many movement bodies founder under such 
conditions, as their activists 'burn out'  (Cox 1997). 
 
The collapse of existing practice and theory 
SNCC attempted, not least under the inspiration of the 
growing black revolt in the cities, to re-orient its activities 
to urban projects. But its activists were ill-prepared for the 
new environment. Black urban residents were more 
socially differentiated, they shared no common institutions 
comparable to the black rural churches, they were more 
alienated and angry and more anti-social. Mobilizing 
urban blacks required the definition of new issues, for 
many of the civil rights reforms had already been carried 
in the cities. Racism was as real, but its targets were less 
easily defined. SNCC activists soon realized that their 
previous victories in the deep South had exaggerated their 
sense of their own power to confront the entrenched, 
resilient institutions responsible for the social problems of 
urban, capitalist industrial society [168]. Few of the urban 
projects made much headway. 
Previous assumptions now came under criticism. A 
group called the 'hardliners' started criticizing 'local 
people-itis', the notion that local people could do no 
wrong, that no one from outside could initiate any kind of 
action or assume any form of leadership [156]. Non-
violence, a previous principle, was undermined by SNCC 
volunteers' discovery that many militant black farmers 
took it for granted that they should carry guns for self-
defence, and numbers of SNCC workers followed suit 
[164].35 More radical critiques of the civil rights 
movement itself began to be voiced: ''The TRUTH is that 
the civil rights movement is not and never was our 
movement' [195]. At the December 1966 conference, a 
few black separatists even ridiculed Fannie Lou Hamer, 
the Mississippi activist who had been central to the MFDP 
struggle and much else, saying she was 'no longer relevant' 
or not at their 'level of development' [240]. 
SNCC entered into a growing organizational crisis. It 
was losing people, some of them formerly very prominent. 
                                                          
35  After violence against the 1966 march following the 
James Meredith shooting, King commented: ''The government 
has got to give me some victories if I'm gonna keep people non-
violent. I know I'm gonna stay non-violent no matter what 
happens. But a lot of people are getting hurt and bitter, and they 
can't see it that way any more' [210]. 
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There were crises of discipline and of morale. Funding 
became more difficult, as SNCC's northern offices 
floundered, as SNCC lost favour with northern liberals for 
the militancy of its rhetoric and as accusations of 
'communism' were voiced more often in the liberal press, 
and as white radicals were turning their attention 
elsewhere, above all to the anti-war movement. The 
response of the leadership to movement events, both at 
Selma in 1965 and over the James Meredith march in 
1966, suggested a tendency for SNCC's decision-making 
processes to break down in a crisis, as its leaders and 
members were pulled between a strong desire to 
encourage mass militancy and yet to avoid actions that 
would disrupt ongoing projects and interfere with the 
development of long-range programmes [159, 206-8]. 
The conditions for creative collective responses to the 
crisis in SNCC's orientation, and to the pressing political 
problems these involved, were ever less favourable. That a 
radical reshaping of SNCC was required was obvious, but 
the direction it took ultimately broke the 'Beloved 
Community.' 
 
Black power and identity politics as responses to despair 
During the Meredith march in 1966, Stokely Carmichael 
publicly espoused the rhetoric of 'black power', in part as a 
response to the growing racial militancy of American 
blacks. 'Black power' was a deeply ambiguous slogan, 
which sounded radical and militant, but the political 
conclusions that might flow from it were never clearly 
defined, and it was open to mis-representation on the one 
side and to capture and use by forces far more 'moderate' 
than SNCC on the other [215-227; see also Shawki 1990]. 
Certainly SNCC was unable to shape the evolution and 
use of the idea. Some SNCC members noted that the stress 
on black power meant a diversion away from notions of 
'class' that had previously inspired their activist style and 
political aims [217, 227, 236]. 
Black power was not without its critics. Harold Cruse 
attacked the mystifications in the notion of a unitary black  
community: 'When one talks bravely about developing 
political and economic black power one had best start 
clarifying which class is going to wield this power. Better 
yet - which class among Negroes has the most power 
now? And which class will benefit from black power 
when it arrives?' (Cruse 1984, cit Polletta 1994: 103). 
Bayard Rustin called the black power perspective 
'simultaneously utopian and reactionary', but combined an 
essential strategic point - that one-tenth of the population 
could not liberate itself alone - with a weak and 
unattractive alternative, that SNCC should return to the 
Democratic Party fold [220]. 
A more rhetorical and dogmatic style of politics went 
along with the turn to Black Power, and with it a more 
hierarchical form of organization (see also Robnett 1997). 
The adoption of Black Power did give sustenance to those 
who were moving towards ideas of black separatism 
within SNCC itself. The shift reflected a new pattern of 
recruitment. New members had joined since SNCC had 
begun to turn away from desegregation struggles to 
attempt a new focus on economic and political goals. 
Their ideas were more often drawn from sources outside 
SNCC (notably from the increasingly popular literature of 
third world liberation) rather than through common 
struggle with people in local communities. But with 
SNCC in strategic and ideological disarray,   'Their brash 
self assurance, based on their sense of rectitude rather than 
political accomplishments, promoted their influence 
among staff members who were searching for a coherent 
view of their changing world' [192].36 The separatists 
declared that all whites were necessarily racist, that SNCC 
and its internal debates were 'contaminated' by the 
presence in its ranks of white members, and they 
demanded an all-black organization. Though they were 
probably in an overall minority, they wore their opposition 
down and white members were all expelled. A few months 
later, the Atlanta group who had been most prominent in 
urging this development were themselves expelled. 
SNCC's 'beloved community' of activists had been 
transformed into a condition where, as Ella Baker sadly 
observed, 'They began to sort of eat on each other.' (cit 
Payne 1995: 367). SNCC itself, from being a distinctive 
group with its own style of organizing among the 
dispossessed, declined in resources and influence, 
becoming 'merely one of many organizations seeking to 
speak on behalf of black communities' [234]. SNCC had 
become, whatever its rhetoric, an ever less relevant 
location of theoretical leadership. 
 
Throwing off the 'muck of ages' 
 
Having examined the weakness of Eyerman and Jamison’s 
static theorizations of cognitive praxis, we began 
proposing alternative perspectives – via a dialogic 
perspective on the Anarchist FAQ, a situational reading of 
Fantasia and Dix’s strike stories, and a historical account 
of SNCC. It is now time to bring these different views 
together, and attempt to offer some answers to the three 
questions posed at the start of this section: What is activist 
theorizing? How does it relate to its social context? Why 
is it 'theory'? 
We want to propose an understanding of theorizing as 
a part of work: thought, in other words, is grounded – 
directly or indirectly – in activity, and forms an integral 
part of human agency.37 Returning to our earlier 
dichotomy between 'traditional' and 'organic' intellectual 
activity, within divided societies we find a tension 
between those forms of thought expressed by traditional 
intellectuals and those expressed by organic intellectuals 
The first forms are interwoven with the agency of already-
dominant social forces, and the second with the agency of 
social movements attempting to develop themselves in this 
already-occupied terrain. 
In this perspective, movement theorizing is an aspect 
of the work that people do as they try to create institutions 
(movements) that will enable them (indirectly, through a 
change in the social order) to meet needs that are not 
currently being met. This section explores the usefulness 
of this metaphor for ‘thinking movement theorizing’, and 
offers possible answers to the three questions above. 
 
Forces and relations of movement production 
                                                          
36 A not dissimilar pattern can be seen in the later evolution 
of the student radical movement, SDS, later in the 160s, when it 
fell apart into a 'system of sects' (Friedman 1984-5). 
37 See Young (n.d.) for related arguments. 
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Movement creative labour involves two kinds of 
relationship. One, equivalent to the ‘forces of production’ 
of Marx's 1859 Preface, is the way in which movement 
workers interact with the equivalent of ‘nature’ – 
including other people in the society (who may be 
recruited into the movement), institutions which oppose 
the movement, forces which might be possible allies, and 
so on. 
In this context it is reasonable to see something of the 
logic of technique: people attempt to discover ‘what 
works’, in demos, in strikes, in dealing with the media, in 
public hearings, in collecting signatures, in forming 
soviets, or whatever else it is. Part of this involves Tilly’s 
(1978, 1993) ‘repertoire of collective action’ (which 
people have to create or appropriate), and part of it entails 
conflicts about how to use the repertoire of collective 
action (e.g. the arguments after Genova about the use of 
violence of various kinds, as well as – in a different key – 
about demonstrations versus ‘dialogue’, etc.) 
However, this logic of technique is constantly 
contested from above: many people are not lucky enough 
to imbibe these ‘forces of production’ at their mother’s 
knee, but have to ‘reinvent the wheel’, or painstakingly 
discover the new continent of movement skills. The 
reasons for this are varied, but include the difficulties 
faced by movement institutions in surviving and providing 
continuity in a world they do not control; the undermining 
of oppositional cultures, and their ‘retraditionalization’; 
and the ‘costs of defeat’ on the individuals who might 
have passed skills on.  
On the other side, the ‘relations of production’ might 
cover how movement workers cooperate with one another 
in the production of ‘social movements’ – including 
formal and informal structures, conflicts and alliances 
internal to and between movements, the languages that are 
drawn on to enable the co-production of even something 
as straightforward as a public meeting, the forms of 
solidarity and mutual support as well as forms of isolation 
and ousting, etc. 
 
Base-superstructure problems 
This analysis could then be read in at least three ways. 
One, ‘Second International Marxist’, reading would be to 
draw a distinction between ‘scientific’, ‘technical’, 
‘neutral’ knowledge (relating to the forces of production: 
the history of revolutions, media framing, conflict 
dynamics, military expertise etc.) and ‘political’, 
‘ideological’ knowledge (concerned with the relations of 
production: theories of appropriate movement structures, 
discussion about the kinds of language which are helpful 
to activist thinking, ‘movement moralities’, etc. It is 
perhaps a bit obvious to say that this distinction doesn’t 
work well in practice, not least because the ‘relations of 
production’ are usually created in political arguments 
about what to do with relation to the outside world 
(‘forces of production’). 
A second, ‘base-superstructure’ possibility would be to 
say that theorizing is unambiguously part of the relations 
of production. If so, it would involve not just how activists 
coordinate their interaction with each other, but would 
include the knowledge they bring to their interaction with 
the external world. Unfortunately, the analogy breaks 
down a bit at this point: because the interaction with the 
social world is also a social interaction, it also entails 
various forms of thought. Furthermore, labour is itself a 
knowledge-generating activity: people learn about wood 
by working it, and only part of that knowledge can be 
codified and ‘taught’ in isolation from actual interaction 
with wood – or in terms of our analogy, forces of 
production necessarily include technical knowledge. 
So a third reading might start from looking more 
closely at the indirect relationship between movement 
work and ‘needs’.38 Movements exist, almost by 
definition, as part of a learning process of interaction with 
the outside world. 
A simplified model, by way of example: people 
experience a need, try to meet it through ‘appropriate 
channels’ (or try to find such channels), and find that they 
don’t get anywhere. In the process, they meet other 
people, and discover that this is a general situation, not 
just a reflection of their own inadequacies. They form an 
organization and try to lobby, but run up against 
increasingly systematic opposition. This experience brings 
it home to them that the problem is not simply ill-will on 
the part of misguided individuals, but has deeper roots. 
Though only an example, it illustrates the two-way nature 
of the learning processes involved in movement. 
 
Movement theorizing and unofficial knowledge 
Gramsci (1991; 1999a; see Cox 1998) discusses a related 
situation in the course of his analysis of knowledge and 
the labour process. In essence, he argues that intellectual 
activity is double: on the one hand, the official forms of 
knowledge, which we are typically presented with in 
general and articulated form and often deeply socialized 
into, and on the other hand, the unofficial knowledge that 
we start to generate for ourselves as we struggle actively 
to resolve the practical problems involved in trying to 
meet our own needs (see Scott 1990; Wainwright 1994).39  
The term struggle is appropriate here: movement 
activists are not the Robinson Crusoes presented by 
individualist rationalisms, nor the beings of pure thought 
presented by idealist constructivisms. It might be more 
appropriate to think of them as people who do not always 
know what needs are driving them, but who are engaged in 
finding out, through struggle and through solidarity.  
Similarly, they do not necessarily know where they are 
going, or who their opponents are: these two are problems 
that they are working on and arguing about, and to which 
they may give very different answers at different stages of 
a conflict. Finally, they do not always know who and what 
they are as social actors: it is in the process of exercising 
their social muscles, struggling in the power-filled and 
uncertain darkness of the social world, that they come to 
find out 'what they can be'. 
 
Movement theorizing 
Such knowledge cannot be divorced from the process of 
movement activity. Although (by contrast with official 
                                                          
38  We don’t deny that people also meet some of their needs 
within movements, but argue that the intrinsic rewards of 
movement membership are not in themselves enough to explain 
the existence of any given movement, though they may explain 
the persistence of some activists! 
39 This latter knowledge, of course, often involves a 
discovery of new needs. 
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theorizing) it is often concrete rather than abstracted, 
implicit rather than explicit, and 'bundled up'40 rather than 
analytic, it can be usefully understood as theoretical 
because it is not simply a product of ‘the situation’ or 'folk 
culture', but is rather a process of ongoing intellectual 
engagement, whose results (as we have shown with 
SNCC) shift over time. 
More formally, movement theorizing consists of the 
processes of unofficial thought that movement activists 
constantly work with – geared primarily towards the 
practical question 'what should we do?', but including all 
sorts of related questions, such as 'who are we?', 'what do 
we want?', 'who is on our side?', 'who are they are what 
are they doing?', 'what can we do?'  
These processes may at times be formalized into what 
Gramsci describes as 'a vision of the world and a rule of 
conduct in conformity with that', but the important thing to 
stress is that both of these – in his language, the 
'theoretical' and the 'directive' aspects of intellectual 
activity – are achievements, and subject to constant 
revision as movements develop and change in interaction 
with opponents and allies. 
Movement theorizing, then, is grounded in the process 
of producing 'social movements' against opposition. It is 
always to some extent knowledge-in-struggle, and its 
survival and development is always contested and in 
process of formation. Its frequently partial, unsystematic 
and provisional character does not make it any the less 
worth our attention, though it may go some way towards 
explaining why academic social movements theory is too 
often content with taking the 'cream off the top', and 
disregarding – or failing to notice – everything that has to 
happen before institutionalized social movement 
theorizing appears in forms that can be easily 
appropriated.  
 
Processes of movement theorizing 
 
We conclude this section with some brief illustrations of 
this process of movement theorizing, which should go 
some way towards illuminating what the above discussion 
means in practice. 
 
Folk and other forms of knowledge 
Firstly, we can note the existence of a significant level of 
'folk knowledge' within activism – understandings which 
are circulated between activists and between generations, 
but which do not necessarily find any formal 
institutionalization. 
One obvious such example is the 'repertoire of 
contention' itself. As Fantasia and Dix’s examples show, 
people can create significant strikes without having any 
past experience of how to do so, and in some cases 
without being union members or coming from 'political' 
backgrounds. Although the role played by more politically 
aware strikers is significant, ordinary workers have 
enough 'folk knowledge' – even in previously non-union 
                                                          
40 This is a rather clumsy way of saying that movement 
knowledge often involves a single answer, proposal or idea 
which contains within it all three of Eyerman and Jamison’s 
dimensions, and sometimes more. 
occupations – to organize strike action, and on occasion 
even to win.  
This particular part of the 'repertoire' had to be created 
(see e.g. Linebaugh 1991 on the development of the 
'strike' in 18th century London), but once developed it has 
become part of folk knowledge, capable of circulating 
even without official institutional supports.  
Another example is the symbolic use of history. Just as 
union officials have often been formally trained in labour 
relations (for good or ill), so too activist organizations 
often put a significant effort into transmitting knowledge 
to their members about 'teaching points' in history: the 
Russian, Irish and Spanish revolutions are all well-known 
examples.  
Beyond this institutionalization, however, people 
remember – family stories are transmitted, pieces of 
'official history' are reread in critical ways, and significant 
oral histories (P. Thompson 2000) of activism circulate 
locally, often without ever having achieved the dignity of 
the printed page.  
That so-and-so came from this organization, or did that 
in 1995, or won this campaign, or has a drink problem, are 
crucial pieces of the local organizing context, albeit often 
fragmentary and not necessarily accurate in their own 
terms. They circulate, though, because in some ways they 
work as tools through which activists grasp the world they 
work within. Much is forgotten, after all, because it is not 
usable in the present, or illustrates no significant point.  
Finally, straightforward urban legends – for example, 
stories about the denial of US Green Cards to activists 
photographed on demonstrations – serve to make moral, 
rather than practical points: in this case, perhaps, that 
activism has its costs (the story is occasionally told to 
justify not taking part in demos), or, more positively, that 
there really is a 'them' as well as an 'us', and that 'we' are 
significant enough – and worry them sufficiently – to be 
photographed and excluded.     
Movements have their folk knowledge, then; while 
bearing a variety of relationships to more institutionalized 
forms of movement knowledge, it is capable of surviving 
and being passed on outside the printed page or the party 
school, and being drawn on by actors who have never yet 
themselves become politically involved. 
 
The different 'levels' of movement theorizing 
The relationship between the different levels of movement 
theorizing is an important question in itself, being one 
which varies dramatically between different movements as 
well as (as our SNCC example suggests) within the same 
organization at different periods in its own development. 
On the 'bottom', movements have not only their own 
'folk' varieties of movement knowledge, but all the 'muck 
of ages' that Marxists have had to engage with, in the 
shape of dominant ideologies, fears and doubts about their 
own abilities and the like, which weakened people’s 
capacity for action, or simply blocked them from anything 
'political'.  
On the 'top', movements not only have their own most 
articulated forms of theorizing – the formalized ideology, 
the book, the 'line' – but also the forms of knowledge 
within 'official' intellectual activity, whose proponents are 
engaged in a constant process of criticizing, colonizing, 
and undermining movement knowledge. 
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A significant question has then been how to relate the 
two. Gramsci’s model of the organic and traditional 
intellectuals – which argues in effect that the 'top' level of 
movement theorizing should be increasingly driven by 
processes of intellectual activity coming 'organically' out 
of the classes in movement, rather than by those coming 
'traditionally' from opposing classes – proposes an implicit 
strategy for one side of the equation. 
He also, though, offers a less-well-known model for 
thinking the other side of the equation, which is the 
relationship between 'movement intellectuals' and 
'ordinary participants' (Gramsci 1997: 163-4; 1999a: 638-
41). Here he contrasts Catholic and communist models of 
movement education. In practice, he argues, the Catholic 
church since the Counter-Reformation represents a model 
of stasis: 'intellectuals' are kept within tightly policed 
boundaries in order to prevent their losing touch entirely 
with the 'simple' – who are themselves, however, to be left 
where they are. 
In the communist model, the role of the (organic) 
intellectuals is to be geared towards the development of 
the 'simple': both are members of the same class, involved 
in the same process of political development, and 
distinctions of leadership between the two are seen as 
something temporary and to be overcome through 
struggle.  
Both sides of this equation are brought together in 
what is in effect a process of 'adult education', not in the 
sense of university professionals teaching 'ordinary 
people', but in the sense of adult self-education, within 
which who learns what from whom is something that may 
shift over time (Mayo 1999). 
It is possible, then, to show that movement activists 
themselves have theories of movement theorizing, which 
share with our account the sense of dialogue and 
development and a refusal to recognize academic theory 
as the only good.   
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3.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has been a pig to write. If nothing else, its 
production illustrates the tensions that exist between the 
processes of activist and academic theorizing! Because of 
the situational and pragmatic nature of activist theorizing, 
it is no easy matter to attempt even a slightly systematic 
exposition. In effect, we are thinking about one mode of 
theorizing within the processes of another – even while 
criticizing the latter. In the name of manageability, this 
conclusion tries to offer a brief summary of the paper, and 
some questions for discussion. 
 
Summary of propositions 
 
1. There is a significant contrast between academic 
and activist modes of theorizing, due above all to 
their different social contexts and purposes. 
2. This can be understood in terms of 'organic' and 
'traditional' intellectuals, two social positions 
which can be analyzed sociologically. 
3. There are significant, but conflictual, 
relationships between the two kinds of 
intellectuals and the two modes of theorizing, and 
an exploration of these can be illuminating for 
both. 
4. Existing academic analyses of the 'cognitive 
praxis' of social movements are unconvincing, 
because they reify particular divisions as given. 
5. An examination of activist theory shows that it is 
dialogical and developmental, as shifting groups 
of activists attempt to find answers to the 
question 'what is to be done?' in situations which 
they do not fully control. 
6. Activist theory can be understood effectively as 
an aspect of the work involved in 'doing' social 
movements – implying that it is formed in a 
process of struggle. 
7. This developmental aspect explains something of 
the different forms taken by activist theorizing as 
an activity. 
 
Questions for discussion 
 
1. Personal / political: how do 'we' (activist / 
academics) live our contradictions? Should we be 
doing something else, and if so what? 
2. Strategical: what are the implications of this for 
movements’ theorizing processes, and what are 
the best ways they can invest in these? 
3. Academic: what does 'social movement theory' 
miss by sidelining movement theory in this sense, 
and is this blindness a good thing or a bad one 
from an activist point of view? 
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